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International trade has constantly increased throughout the second half of the 20th
century, and this trend will continue well into the 21st century. The practice of interna-
tional trade has evolved from simple purchase of final goods of foreign origin to trade in
intermediate inputs, then further to production process sharing under which firms produce
customized inputs for firms in foreign countries. The term that we hear very often in the
media especially since the 2004 election campaign, ”offshore outsourcing,” refers to the use
of either foreign firms through arm’s length contracts or own subsidiaries in foreign coun-
tries to perform some tasks that the outsourcing firms previously performed domestically.
Due to the nature of direct replacement of domestic tasks with foreign supplies, offshore
outsourcing has been blamed for destroying American jobs. As the practice of offshore
outsourcing expands to service-related tasks that affect our daily lives, such as customer
service call centers, the general public started see offshore outsourcing as a threat to every
American job.
However, discussions around offshore outsourcing tend to be built around the resulting
job losses, and the job creation that may be caused by the gain in efficiency is often neglected.
In order to truly understand the labor market impact of offshore outsourcing, we should
give equal weight to job creation as well as destruction. The change in aggregate domestic
employment could be positive if the efficiency gain from offshore outsourcing is large enough
to create more jobs that it destroys.
Despite the attention that offshore outsourcing has received for the past few years,
there have not been a sufficient amount of empirical studies on this subject to provide
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us with an answer to whether offshore outsourcing is harmful or beneficial to domestic
employment. The findings of currently available empirical research on U.S. multinationals
suggest that the effect is ambiguous. The source of such ambiguity is very difficult to identify
empirically due to data limitations. In this dissertation, I use structural models to answer
this very question. In the second and third chapters, I perform a theoretical analysis of the
various employment responses - firm-level as well as aggregate - to offshore outsourcing. The
heterogeneity in firm-level productivity that is assumed in the model of chapter II allows
us to see what types of firms decide to outsource and how employment changes in different
groups of firms in response to the possibility of outsourcing when firms face competition
from firms in other countries with comparable technology levels. In chapter III, I look at
how aggregate employment changes when homogeneous firms face competition from cheaper
goods produced in developing countries - where both wage rate and productivity are lower
than for home firms. I also look at the amounts of both job creation and job destruction,
identifying the circumstances in which job creation may exceed job destruction.
The analyses of chapters II and III are based on the assumption of perfect labor mobility
across occupations. The size of the change in aggregate employment - regardless of whether
it is a gain or loss - estimated under this assumption should be understood as a rather
a long-run consequence of offshore outsourcing. Job destruction tends to happen in the
labor-intensive low skill jobs and the new jobs created tend to be high skill positions. In
the short-run, for this reason, the displaced workers are not readily employable in the
jobs that are created by offshore outsourcing. It takes retraining of the displaced workers,
and this might be a lengthy process. Offshore outsourcing can be beneficial to all agents
in an economy through several channels – the rise aggregate income, a rise in available
varieties, and reduction in price level - but the displaced workers certainly suffer from this
adjustment process in this new era of globalization. The U.S. government established the
Trade Adjustment Assistance program in order to reduce the adjustment costs of these
workers by providing retraining services and income support during training. The efficacy
of the TAA program is analyzed in this dissertation, in chapter IV.
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In chapter II, I perform a theoretical analysis of the labor market implications of offshore
outsourcing and quantify various employment responses by calibrating parameter values
to match the U.S. manufacturing sector. I construct a partial equilibrium model of an
industry facing offshore outsourcing with a continuum of firms with heterogeneity in their
productivities. In this model, the world market is composed of two developed countries that
are identical. Firms from developed countries have the option to outsource part of their
process to a low-wage developing country that does not consume the product. Heterogeneity
in firm-level productivities generates different firm-level responses to outsourcing: the most
productive firms outsource, the least productive firms are forced to exit (the Cleansing
Effect), and the firms with intermediate productivity level continue operating as home-
producers.
The theory generates a strong prediction that offshore outsourcing unambiguously re-
duces aggregate employment at home. However, the numerical analysis finds that the
net employment effect within outsourcing firms is indeed ambiguous and that, more strik-
ingly, the strong negativity of the overall employment effect stems from the cleansing effect.
This result suggests that empirical investigation of multinationals understates the true em-
ployment effect of offshore outsourcing. By decomposing net employment loss into job
destruction and creation, this paper finds that the net employment change can be less than
half of the gross employment change, and that the layoffs by outsourcers account for the
majority of total job destruction. These findings suggest that the previous empirical stud-
ies, of outsourcing firms alone, understate the negative impact of offshore outsourcing on
employment.
In chapter III, I examine the net employment effect - job creation as well as job de-
struction - of offshoring with a structural model of offshoring with two countries (north for
the higher wage country, and south for the lower wage one), two industries (agriculture and
manufacturing), and one factor (labor). Offshoring occurs in the monopolistically compet-
itive manufacturing industry where goods are produced through two physically separable
processes - assembly and services. Countries differ in wage rates and efficiency levels in
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their service segments. These differences determine the pattern of outsourcing and, thus,
the effect on manufacturing employment in both countries. The numerical analysis finds
that outsourcing raises tremendously the share of the market served by northern varieties.
For benchmark parameters, there is gain of 48% of the world market from outsourcing. The
employment effect is also generally positive, implying that the job creation from the benefits
of outsourcing is larger than the job destruction caused directly by the physical relocation
of part of the business processes.
Chapters II and III share some common features such as that the business process is
composed of two segments, and outsourcing consists of sending part of the process abroad.
However, the models in these two chapters are fundamentally different and are used to
answer different sets of questions. First, the model of the second chapter focuses on the
competition between two developed countries. The developing country is only a host of
outsourcing activities and does not consume the finished product. This setup simplifies
the analysis enough to allow firm-level heterogeneity in productivity. Since firms behave
differently under this assumption, the aggregate employment change is different from the
firm-level employment effect. With the analysis of firm-level responses - their outsourcing
decision and employment responses, we can see which firms bring about net job destruc-
tion and which firms create more jobs than they destroy. The focus on the competition
between developed countries also allows us to expand the analysis to include evaluation of
anti-outsourcing legislation. In 2004, many policies have been proposed to discourage off-
shore outsourcing, but these policies do not consider the counterfactuals where US firms are
prohibited from outsourcing while their competitors - for instance, European and Japanese
firms - still take advantage of cost reducing outsourcing. The loss of US firms’ competi-
tiveness in the world market due to the legislations would reduce their market share, so
employment by these firms would shrink. Although the analysis of this counterfactual is
not performed in the second chapter, it is ready to be performed and is certainly on the
future agenda of this research.
On the other hand, the model of chapter III assumes that firms are homogenous. The
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simplification at this level allows us to analyze the competition between two distinctive
countries - one developed country and one developing country. The relative productivities
of the two countries differ in two distinct business segments - assembly and services. It
therefore could be profitable for firms from a developing country to outsource their service
segments if the developed country has far superior technology that more than offsets the
disadvantage from their high relative wage. Therefore, in this model, two-way outsourc-
ing is permitted. This can explain the phenomenon that developed countries outsource
labor-intensive tasks, such as assembly and call center services, to developing countries and
developing countries outsource skill-intensive tasks, such as automobile design and financial
consulting, to developed countries. Allowing the developing country to compete against the
developed country allows us to analyze the impact of offshore outsourcing on the developing
country in terms of employment and the growth of aggregate income. The consumption
power of China and India - the two major destinations of offshore outsourcing - are grow-
ing rapidly as they enjoy the influx of foreign investment; thus they will grow to be very
important consumers of goods of developed countries. This ’breeding the future consumers’
effect of offshore outsourcing will have tremendously positive impact on the profitability of
firms from developed countries, and also on their employment, and the model of the third
chapter can analyze this effect.
In chapter IV, I look at the problem of outsourcing at the level of the workers who suffer
from the rise in competition from developing countries by looking at the training services
of the TAA program. The efficacy of training services has been evaluated in several studies
by comparing TAA trainees and non-trainees. They find that trainees perform better after
exiting the program. In this chapter, I measure the success of the training provision of the
TAA program in terms of the match between occupations for which workers are trained
and the occupations of their later employment. I investigate whether a match improves
post-participation outcomes of customers. For the analysis, I use the Trade Act Participant
Record (TAPR) acquired through the Freedom of Information Act. This is the first academic
paper that utilizes the TAPR dataset.
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The dataset shows a matching rate of 44.6% among trainees overall. While post-
participation outcomes are greatly affected by the personal characteristics of the customers
such as their educational attainment and age, matching significantly improves the post-
participation earnings of customers both in absolute terms (post-participation earnings)
and relative terms (wage replacement rate). Matching raises the wage replacement rate
by 3 to 4 percentage points. Also, while receipt of training services regardless of a match
improves the reemployment rates (by 5 percentage points), trainees who failed to find a
match but got a job have poorer outcomes - both their levels of earnings and their wage
replacement rates - than non-trainees. This implies that achieving a match is an important
measure of successful training programs and allocating resources properly to better coor-
dinate training with job opportunities can improve the performance of the TAA program
and its cost efficiency.
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Chapter II
The Cleansing Effect of Offshore Outsourcing
in an Analysis of Employment
1 Introduction
In 2004, offshore outsourcing became so common in the public perception that it became
a frequent topic of everybody’s dinner-table talk. Especially since it was an election year,
it was very much a political matter rather than just an economic phenomenon. Presi-
dential candidates did not hesitate to blame outsourcing for large losses of manufacturing
jobs. They went a step further to promise the nation that they would stop the outflow of
American jobs. Mankiw and Swagel (2006) show the explosive rise in media references1 to
“outsourcing” in their Figure 1. In 2002 and 2003, the references were around 300 in each
year, then it increased to more than 1000 in 2004.
There is yet no consensus definition of offshore outsourcing. Many studies use “off-
shoring” as carrying out some stages of production at owned affiliates in the foreign coun-
try; and “offshore outsourcing” as that using arm’s-length contract (Harrison and McMillan,
2006). However, I use “outsourcing” to refer to both foreign production at owned affiliates
and through arm’s-length contract. “Offshore outsourcing” and “outsourcing” are used
interchangeably.
1Reference by four major newspapers: The New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles
Times, and USA Today
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Despite the public concern about the link between offshore outsourcing and job loss,
empirical studies find that the employment effect of outsourcing is neither unanimously
negative nor of significant magnitude. One branch of empirical literature focuses its atten-
tion on the activities of foreign affiliate operations of multinational enterprises. They use
firm-level data to investigate the within-firm labor substitution between domestic facilities
and foreign affiliates. One of the most frequently used datasets is the firm-level surveys on
U.S. Direct Investment Abroad collected by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Brainard and Riker (1997) find small substitution between US facilities and foreign affil-
iates, and stronger substitution among foreign affiliates in low-wage countries. Stronger
substitution between US employment and foreign affiliate employment is found by Hanson,
Mataloni, and Slaughter (2003). On the other hand, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005) find
complementarity between US locations and foreign affiliates of US multinationals. They
find that when foreign employment rises by 10%, US employment within the firm rises
by 2.5%. In Contrast, Borga (2005) finds an insignificant effect of offshore outsourcing.
Harrison and McMillan (2007) separate horizontal affiliates from vertical affiliates, and also
high-cost locations from low-cost locations. They find employment complementarity for
vertical affiliates, but substitution for horizontal affiliates. There are also empirical studies
on the outsourcing activities of other industrial nations. Muendler and Becker (2006) inves-
tigate German multinational enterprises (MNEs) and find strong substitution. Braconier
and Ekholm (2000), in their study of Swedish multinationals, find substitution between
Swedish facilities and affiliates in high-income countries, but neither substitution nor com-
plementarity between Swedish locations and affiliates in low-income countries.
Although these firm-level data are very rich in various operational information, foreign
operation of multinationals should not be the definitive measure of offshore outsourcing
activities. In fact, a large portion of offshore outsourcing takes place through arm’s-length
contracts (Crino, 2007). If offshore outsourcing through own foreign affiliates and through
arm’s-length contracts are driven by distinct incentives (Grossman and Helpman, 2003),
their effect on employment at the headquarter location can also be different.
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Another branch of the empirical literature takes a sectoral approach. Studies using this
approach construct a measure of offshore outsourcing in each industry - at various levels
of aggregation - and look for a correlation between this measure and industry employment.
The employment effects from these studies are also weak. Amiti and Wei (2006) use the
share of imported inputs as a measure of outsourcing, and find that the employment effect
is insignificant at the disaggregated level, but positive at a more aggregated level in the U.S.
manufacturing sector between 1992 and 2000. In a similar study, Amiti and Wei (2005) find
an insignificant employment effect in the U.K. manufacturing industry between 1995 and
2001. For the Canadian manufacturing sector, Morissette and Johnson (2007) find that the
industries with intense outsourcing did not show significantly different employment growth
rates composed to other industries. Keller and Stehrer (2008) use Austrian data and find
that offshore outsourcing has a negative effect during 1995-2000, but a positive effect during
2000-2003.
These ambiguous results suggest that outsourcers may create a number of jobs that is
large enough to offset their layoffs. Outsourcing firms might be the source of job destruction,
but they are also the ultimate beneficiaries of outsourcing, and the realized benefits will be
translated into new jobs. However, these insignificant net effects might reflect a combination
of small job destruction and small job creation, or alternatively large destruction and large
creation. Although both may result in net effects of the same magnitude, they imply very
different adjustment costs for workers. In many cases, offshore outsourcing takes the form
of relocation of the most labor-intensive part of the process. This implies that jobs that
are destroyed and jobs that are newly created are likely to be different in their tasks and
skill levels. In other words, the laid-off workers are not readily employable for the new jobs.
In order to reduce the adjustment cost of workers, it is often necessary to provide them
with occupational training and, in some cases, remedial education through a program such
as Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA).2 In order to properly assist the displaced workers,
2The TAA program is specially designed for unemployed workers whose layoffs are caused by
international trade, including import competition and relocation of production sites to foreign coun-
tries, with the purpose of helping them get a new job sooner. The TAA services and benefits include
occupational training, remedial education, and income support during training.
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correct understanding and measurement of the size of outsourcing-related separation is
required. None of currently available data on outsourcing activities is appropriate for this
purpose. Data on multinationals’ operations fail to capture outsourcing activities that
utilize arm’s length contracts. These data also do not report the amount of separation
separately from new hires. Data on outsourcing activities measured by usage of imported
inputs fail to capture outsourcing in the form of foreign assembly.
For this reason, we need more structural theoretical analysis to capture various labor
market dynamics that drive the aggregate impact that we can observe in data. In this
paper, I construct a partial equilibrium model of offshore outsourcing with firms that are
heterogeneous in their productivity levels (Melitz, 2003). Initially there are two symmetric
northern countries that are open for international trade. The manufacturing process consists
of two segments, Assembly and Services. As outsourcing becomes feasible, outsourcing
firms send their assembly segments to a Southern country that does not consume the final
products. Using this structural model, I find that the most productive firms outsource -
as found in Kurz (2006) - and that the least productive firms are forced to exit. I call
the exit of the least productive firms the Cleansing Effect of Offshore Outsourcing.3 With
this structural model, I can quantify job creation separately from job destruction, and the
employment response of different groups of firms - the cleansing effect, non-outsourcers, and
outsourcers - separately.
I find that outsourcing unambiguously reduces aggregate employment as outsourcing
becomes feasible. Whether this result is contrary to previous empirical findings requires
further analysis, since this model includes the entire industry rather than only the out-
sourcers. For this, I perform numerical analysis by using benchmark parameter values that
are calibrated to match the initial and outsourcing equilibrium to the U.S. manufacturing
sector of 1992 and 2006, respectively. I find that the net employment loss may reach up
to 36% of total initial employment. However, the majority (50-75%, 53% for parameter
3The term ‘Cleansing Effect’ is first used by Caballero and Hammour (1994). They use the term
to refer to firms’ restructuring strategy that clean outdate techniques or less profitable products out
of their plants during recession when adjustment cost is low.
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values for 2006) of such net employment loss is due to the job destruction brought about
by the cleansing effect of outsourcing rather than layoffs by outsourcers. As a sensitivity
analysis, I show the cleansing effect as a share of net employment loss for six different sets
of parameter values. All six cases confirm the dominance of the cleansing effect in driving
the negative net employment effect. Although the cleansing effect is not directly related to
outsourcing activities, such job destruction is clearly an outcome of offshore outsourcing.
This finding implies that the BEA dataset is only valid for the analysis of within-firm em-
ployment effects among outsourcers. In order to discuss the more aggregate employment
effects that outsourcing brings about, non-outsourcers, and even the firms that disappear
from the market as a result of outsourcing, should be included in the analysis as subjects.
The numerical analysis confirms the previous finding that employment effect of out-
sourcing on outsourcing firms alone is ambiguous. For the benchmark parameter values,
the net effect ranges from 17% net loss to 3% net gain. For six different sets of parameter
values, the employment effect in outsourcing firms alone varies from large negative (32%
net employment loss) to large positive (12% of net gain). The separate analysis of job
destruction and creation shows that the observable net employment change is less than half
of the gross job flow. Total job destruction is up to 60% of initial employment and total
job creation reaches up to 24%. Despite the striking dominance of the cleansing effect in
the net employment effect, the layoffs by outsourcers indeed account for a larger portion of
total job destruction, implying that despite the ambiguous net employment effect, the lay-
offs by outsourcers are an important socio-economic phenomenon that deserves a significant
amount of policy attention.
Besides the impact on employment, I show theoretically that outsourcing promotes
international trade by eliminating the price disadvantage that exporters face in their foreign
market in the absence of outsourcing. Also, I find that outsourcing reduces the total number
of varieties available to consumers. This is a surprising result since product variety gain
has been discussed as one of the most important benefits of international trade. This result
stems from the fact that outsourcing benefits large-scale firms with high productivities, and
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the cleansing effect drives the small producers out of the market.
The structure of this model can be used for evaluation of various type of anti-outsourcing
legislation. For instance, we can analyze the effect of complete prohibition of outsourcing
in raising domestic employment by comparing the outsourcing equilibrium presented in the
paper to the asymmetric outsourcing equilibrium where firms from one northern country
(the home country) is prohibited from outsourcing while outsourcing of the other country’s
firms and international trade are allowed. The model can be used to evaluate more specific
policy proposal. For instance, in order to evaluate the efficacy of John Kerry’s policy
proposal that repeals the tax break for outsourcing firms4, I can add one parameter for
price distortion caused by changes in tax.5 Although this is of great policy relevance, it is
beyond the scope of this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Sections
3 and 4 present, respectively, the analytical results and numerical analyses. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Model
Initially, there are two symmetric Northern countries that produce and consume the man-
ufacturing products. Two countries trade with each other, so each market is served by its
local products and imported products. There is a continuum of firms that are heterogeneous
in their productivities. Each firm utilizes only labor as a factor to perform two processes
- assembly and services - in order to manufacture the final products. A representative
consumer has CES preference over the continuum of goods, so demand for each good is
determined by its price relative to the market price index. As outsourcing becomes feasible,
I introduce a Southern country with a lower wage as a host of outsourcing activities. The
South does not have a market for the final products. A Northern firm has an option to
4for more detail, see Mankiw and Swagel (2006)
5Or more easily, I can adjust the Southern wage rate which then affects the total price of out-
sourced products.
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outsource its assembly segment to the South to save its production cost.
2.1 Set-up
2.1.1 Demand
A representative consumer has CES preference over a continuum of goods (indexed by ω).








Ω is the set of available varieties. The consumer spends a fixed amount of expenditure, R,
on these differentiated varieties. For each variety, the quantity demanded, q(ω), and the















where ε is the elasticity of substitution and equal to ε = 1/(1− ρ). P is the price index for









Labor is the only factor of production and the production technology is represented by
unit labor requirement. Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity level. Upon entry,
a firm draws a productivity z from a cumulative distribution G(z). The firm’s unit labor
requirement is then determined as 1/z.
Production of the final good is composed of two segments, assembly and services. Each
process utilizes a fixed share of workers with γ as the employment share of service segment.
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Therefore, labor requirement for each segment for one unit of final good is the following:
Assembly : (1− γ)/z Services : γ/z (5)
If the firm exports, it incurs an additional fixed cost of exporting, fx. Outsourcing also
involves an additional fixed cost, fos. For instance, total labor requirement for a firm that
does neither export nor outsource is




where q(z) is the quantity demanded. The wage rate in both Northern countries is equal
to one.
2.1.3 Decision Making Process
A new firm enters the market incurring the sunk entry cost, fe. The entrant gets a produc-
tivity draw, z, from the distribution G(z). After observing z, the firm decides whether to
stay and produce at the fixed production cost, f , or to exit. In the absence of outsourcing,
successful entrants again decide whether to export to the other Northern country at an
additional fixed export cost, fx. Where outsourcing is feasible, successful entrants choose
one of the following options: first, produce at home without exporting; second, produce
at home and export (additional fixed export cost, fx); third, outsource and serve only the
domestic market (additional fixed outsourcing cost, fos); and lastly, outsource and export
(additional cost fx + fos).
After successful entry, every firm faces a probability of death, ξ, regardless of their pro-
ductivity levels, every period. In a steady state equilibrium, as some of existing firms exit,
new entrants fill their spots.
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2.2 Open Economy without Offshore Outsourcing
The set-up and equilibrium of the economy in the absence of outsourcing is borrowed from
the open economy model of Melitz (2003). There are two Northern countries who are
identical and trade their final goods with each other.
Every firm produces a different variety and charges a monopoly price. For domestic












The subscript d and hp respectively indicate variables for domestic operation and variables
for home-producers - firms that perform both assembly and services in their home countries.
The profit from a firm’s domestic sales is




where the revenue function, rd,hp(z) is, drawing from equations (3) and (7)
rd,hp(z) = R (Pρz)
ε−1 (9)
If this firm decides to export, it will charge the monopoly price inclusive of transport cost.
Transport cost takes the form of the iceberg cost. The price of the same product in foreign
market is, therefore,
px,hp(z) = τpd,hp(z) (10)
The subscript x indicates the variables for export operation. All exporters also serve their
domestic markets. Since the total fixed cost of an exporter is f + fx whether it serves its
domestic market or not, it is always more profitable to serve its domestic market as well
as its foreign market. For this reason, I can separately express the export profit from the
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The total profit of an exporter is sum of equations (8) and (11).
2.2.1 Initial Open Economy Equilibrium
As seen in Melitz (2003), the equilibrium is characterized by two productivity cut-offs that
summarize two decisions of firms - entry and exporting. I let z0hp and z
0
x denote the entry
and export cut-off productivity, respectively. Superscript 0 indicates the variables for the
initial open economy equilibrium.




ε − f = 0 (12)
πx,hp(žx,hp) =
rx,hp(žx,hp)
ε − fx = 0
Since both profit functions, πd,hp(z) and πx,hp(z), are monotonically increasing in z, žd,hp
and žx,hp provide the cut-off productivity for entry and export. That is, every firm with
z > žd,hp will remain and serve the domestic market and every firm with z > žx,hp will
export in addition to its domestic operation. The total profit of a firm depends on entry
and export status, and can be written as follows:
πhp(z) =

0 if z < žd,hp
πd,hp(z) if žd,hp ≤ z < žx,hp
πd,hp(z) + πx,hp(z) if z ≥ žx,hp
(13)




the zero profit productivity cut-offs, žd,hp and žx,hp, respectively. The equilibrium profit
function and the pattern of operation are depicted in Figure 1.










In order for both exporters and non-exporters to exist, the fixed export cost must be suffi-
ciently large. More specifically,
fx > τ
1−εf (15)
I assume that inequality (15) holds throughout this paper.
Let M0d denote the number of domestic varieties in the initial open economy equilibrium,
and M0x the number of exporters. Due to symmetry, M
0
x is also the number of imported




x . I define



























From equations (4), (7), and (17), I can derive two aggregate variables - price index, P0,
and the aggregate revenue, R - as functions of the average productivity, z̃0t .
P0 = M0t
1
1−ε pd,hp(z̃0t ) (18)





Let π̄0 denote the average profit of all operating firms in the initial open economy equilib-
rium. It can be written as










Using two zero cut-off profit conditions - equation (12) - together with equations (9) and
(11), we can rewrite the average profit function as the following.













There is free entry in the market. Therefore, the expected value of entry must be zero









The probability of successful entry in the initial open economy equilibrium is 1 − G(z0hp),





The equilibrium entry cut-off productivity, z0hp, must satisfy equations (22) and (25)
simulatneously. This constitutes the condition for the initial open economy equilibrium as
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the following.









where the cut-off productivity for exporting, z0x, is a function of z
0
hp, as in equation (14).
2.3 Open Economy with Outsourcing
Outsourcing takes the form of relocating assembly segment to another country. I introduce
a Southern country that can perform assembly and does not demand the final product. The
South has a lower wage rate, δ, which is smaller than one. (δ is wage rate per efficiency unit
of labor, controlling for any differential in labor productivity.) The production technology is
firm-specific, so the productivity, z, is preserved regardless of the location of assembly. The
only advantage of outsourcing is the lower wage rate, which is equivalent to a productivity
improvement in the sense that it lowers production cost.









= [(1− γ)δ + γ] 1
z
That is, in comparison with the marginal production cost in the absence of outsourcing,
mcos(z) = λ ·mcd,hp(z) where λ = (1− γ)δ + γ (27)
Since now assembly and services take places in different countries, I need to define the
geographical structure of the integration of two production segments and consumption. I
assume that the integration of assembly and service segment is virtual and that goods are
completed in the South. That is as if the service portion is performed in the firm’s home
country and shipped to the South for completion, but there is no iceberg transport cost
involved. Service and assembly segments are integrated at the location of assembly. Any
extra cost involved in the integration process can be captured by the fixed outsourcing cost,
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fos. After completion, final goods are shipped to the market for consumption directly from
the South. The iceberg transport cost, τ , applies to shipment of final goods. One anecdotal
example is computer manufacturing industry. More sophisticated tasks - such as research
and development, and management services - are performed in the US while a lot of part
manufacturing and final assembly is done in low-wage country, such as China, and the world
demand is met by direct shipments from those locations.
The transportation structure is summarized in Figure 2. Panel (a) describes traditional
international trade where goods are shipped directly from its origin countries. This applies
to all firms in the initial open economy equilibrium and non-outsourcers in the outsourcing
equilibrium. Panel (b) describes the case for outsourcers. Figure 2 is depicted for two
representative goods that is produced by two firms originated in two Northern countries.
These goods are produced with the same productivity. The circles represent the national
borders; and two prices in each circle represent the prices of local and imported goods,
respectively. One can see that goods face price disadvantage in their foreign markets.
Where goods are outsourced, the markup over the marginal cost of both goods upon
completion at the Southern facilities is λP . These goods are shipped to both markets
where they are sold for τλP . Therefore, outsourcing lowers domestic prices from P to τλP ,
while it lowers export prices from τP to τλP . For this reason, exporters benefit more
from outsourcing than non-exporters do. For instance, where τλ ≤ 1, non-exporters do not
have an incentive to outsource while exporters still might depending on the relative size of
domestic and foreign sales.6
As described in Figure 1, the price of an outsoucer with productivity z, which is the
same for domestic and forein sales, is as follows.




6I do not allow partial outsourcing - outsource assembly segment for export sales only while
perform both assembly and services at home for domestic sales. For the analysis, I excluded (later)
the cases where τλ ≤ 1 and focus on the equilibria with sufficient incentive to outsource. The
feasibility of partial outsourcing is not relevant where τλ < 1.
20
Since prices in the home and foreign markets are the same, revenues from the two markets
are the same as well.7






There is a fixed cost of outsourcing, fos. Outsourcing firms incur fos in addition to the
fixed production cost f , and fixed export cost fx in case they export. As in the initial
open economy equilibrium, all exporting outsourcers also serve their domestic markets; so










I define two zero-profit productivity levels žd,os and žx,os; that is,
πd,os(žd,os) = 0 ⇐⇒ rd,os(žd,os) = ε(f + fos) (32)
πx,os(žx,os) = 0 ⇐⇒ rx,os(žx,os) = εfx
Depending on the sizes of fixed costs, we get two different total profit functions. First,
if fx > f + fos, žx,os will be above žd,os, and the total profit function will look like panel (a)
of Figure 3.8 In this case, exporting requires larger revenue, and some outsourcers are not
productive enough to meet the required amount of sales. Therefore, there are non-exporting
outsourcers as well as exporting ones; and the total profit function of an outsourcer with
productivity z is as follows.
πos(z) =

0 if z < žd,os
πd,os(z) if žd,os ≤ z < žx,os
πd,os(z) + πx,os(z) if z ≥ žx,os
(33)
7Revenues depend on price indices. Due to symmetry, price indices are equal in two markets.
8This is because domestic and export revenue are equal and monotonically increasing in z.
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On the other hand, where fx < f + fos, exporting is very attractive, so all outsourcers
export. This case is depicted in panel (b) of Figure 3. In this case, the break-even point is
neither at žd,os nor at žx,os. It is where the total profit - sum of domestic and export profits
- is zero. I call this productivity level, žos, and define it as the following.
πd,os(žos) + πx,os(žos) = 0 (34)
The total profit function for an outsourcer in this case is
πos(z) =

0 if z < žos
πd,os(z) + πx,os(z) if z ≥ žos
(35)
Not to participate in outsourcing is still an option for firms. I call the firms that choose
not to outsource home-producers. In this equilibrium, variables for home-producers are
indicated by subscript hp. Their total profit function is introduced by equations (8), (9),
(11)-(14) and is depicted in Figure 1.
2.3.1 Equlibria
Firms make three decisions in the outsourcing equilibrium: first, whether to stay in the
market or exit (exit/stay); second, whether to produce at home or outsource (assembly
location); finally, whether to export (export status). Such decisions are based on two profit
functions, πhp(z) - equation (13) - and πos(z) - equation (33) and (35). More Specifically,
a firm will choose to stay in the market if its profit with either strategy - outsourcing
or home-production - is positive. This firm will outsource if outsourcing profit is larger
than home-production profit, and will not outsource otherwise. Finally, this firm exports
if its productivity is higher than the relevant zero-profit productivity for exporting - žx,hp
or žx,os - depending on the choice of assembly location. These decisions depend crucially
on where πhp(z) and πos(z) intersect, and where these curves kink. These features of two
profit functions, then, depend on parameter values - size of cost reduction (λ), transport
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cost (τ), elasticity of substitution (ε), and the sizes of fixed costs (f, fx, fos). According
to these parameter values, we have twelve different equilibria where outsourcing is feasible.
Table 1 summarizes the conditions for each equilibrium and Figure 4 shows various cut-off
productivities and the pattern of operation for each equilibrium. The derivation process is
explained in detail in Technical Appendix.9
Although each equilibrium is fundamentally different - they correspond to different pa-
rameter values - some share the same operational pattern. In practice, different industries
have distinctive characteristics; therefore, they respond to the feasibility of offshore out-
sourcing differently. For this reason, every equilibrium of Figure 4 has its own practical
significance and is worth investigating. However, the goal of this paper is to study the re-
sponse of labor market to offshore outsourcing; so, I devote the attention to the case where
outsourcing brings out employment response of significant size. Recall that where τλ ≤ 1,
non-exporters do not have an incentive to outsource because outsourcing raises the prices
for domestic sales. Therefore, I focus on the equilibria under the condition τλ < 1 where
outsourcing lowers domestic prices as well as export prices. According to table 1, equilibria
a, b, c, d, h, i, and j satisfy the condition.
The operational patterns of these seven equilibria, then, can be summarized as in Figure
5. Equilibrium b shows pattern A; c and i shows pattern B; and, d and j show pattern C.
Equilibrium h corresponds to pattern I, and equilibrium a to II. I combine the information
provided by table 1 and Figure 5 and show the sizes of fixed costs that correspond to each
pattern given other parameter values in Figure 6. α is the size of fixed export cost relative
to that of fixed production cost (α = fx/f), and β denotes the size of fixed outsourcing cost
relative to f (β = fos/f).
According to Figure 6, we achieve patterns I and II where fixed outsourcing cost is very
small. Under these two patterns, all firms take advantage of outsourcing; therefore, there is
no home-producer in the market. In addition to small fixed outsourcing cost, pattern I also
has a very small fixed export cost; therefore, every firm exports. Under pattern II, there
9avaiable on www.umich.edu/∼ejpark/jypark cleansing tech.pdf
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exist non-exporting outsourcers as well as exporting ones.
Pattern A, B, and C are where the fixed outsourcing cost is large enough for some firms
to choose not to outsource. For a given value of fixed export cost, pattern A has the smallest
fixed outsourcing cost, and C has the largest. This determines the number of outsourcers
in these three patterns. Under the pattern A (smallest β), outsourcing is more attractive
than exporting, so outsourcing cut-off productivity is lower than that of exporting. Under
the pattern C, the opposite is true, so the productivity cut-off for exporting is lower than
that of outsourcing. Pattern B is the intermediate case, and export cut-off productivity
coincides with the outsourcing cut-off productivity. Accordingly, pattern A have the largest
number of outsourcers, and the impact of outsourcing on the industry - such as the effect
on employment - is the largest.
In order to analyze the impact of outsourcing on the various aspects of the industry,
comparison between the initial open economy equilibrium and the outsourcing equilibrium
is required. However, this comparison should be carried out separately for each outsourcing
equilibrium pattern - I, II, A, B, and C - because the firms’ operational responses differ
across patterns. In the next section, I present the detailed model under the pattern A where
outsourcing affects the economy to a greatest extent. The detailed model for other patterns
is not presented in this paper, but other patterns will be included in the analysis.
2.3.2 Equilibrium Pattern A.
The operational pattern A can be observed in the outsourcing equilibrium b. Under this
pattern, there are three groups of firms - home producers that only serve their domestic
market, outsourcers that only serve their domestic market, and outsourcers that serve both
domestic and foreign markets. As can be seen in panel (b) of Figure 4 and panel (c)
of Figure 5, the firms with the lowest productivities are home-producers. Therefore, the
entry cut-off productivity, zAhp, is at the zero-profit productivity, žd,hp - equation (12). The






All exporters are outsourcers, so the export cut-off productivity, zAx is the productivity level
with which an outsourcer’s export profit is zero - žx,os, equation (32). The superscript A
indicates the variables under the pattern A of the outsourcing equilibrium. Using equations
(8), (9), and (29)-(32), zAos and z
A
x can be written as functions of z
A










































x , respectively, denote the numbers of home producers’ varieties, out-
sourcers’ varieties, and imported varieties. MAt is the total number of varieties that are








hp is the average productivity
























os. The aggregate revenue
and the price index are, from equations (7), (18), and (19),











As in the initial open economy equilibrium, an equilibrium condition is made up of
two equations that characterize the average profit of active firms in equilibrium. First,
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the average profit is sum of average profits of firms with different operational strategies
- non-exporting home-producers, non-exporting outsourcers, and exporting outsourcers -























Using equations (8)-(11), (16), (23), (29)-(31), and (36), equation (41) can be rewritten as
the following:











Free entry condition requires that the expected value of entry is equal to the sunk entry





The derivation of equation (44) is identical to that of equation (25). Finally, the equi-
librium is represented by the cut-off productivities that satisfy equations (43) and (44)
simultaneously.















The impact of offshore outsourcing on the economy can be analyzed by comparing features
of the outsourcing equilibrium to those of the initial open economy equilibrium. Although
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the ultimate goal of this paper is to investigate the labor market response to outsourcing,
the rich structure of the model allows us to derive many valuable economic implications. In
this section, I do not restrict the analysis to the equilibrium pattern A and rather expand the
scope to patterns B and C as well. More specifically, I analyze the subset of the equilibrium
space introduced by Figure 6; that is
α > (τλ)1−ε and β > (τλ)1−ε − 1 (46)
Patterns I and II - where every active firm outsources - are also interesting and are practically
plausible, I do not discuss them for the rest of the paper.
First, I look at the changes in entry and export cut-off productivities, and where out-
sourcing cut-off productivity is located. The location of cut-off productivities is of great
importance because it determines the operational responses of firms. For instance, a change
in the entry cut-off productivities either forces some firms to exit, or invites more firms to
stay active in the market. A change in export cut-off productivities either generates or
eliminates export opportunities for some firms. The location of outsourcing cut-off pro-
ductivities determines how many firms lay off workers to relocate their assembly segments
(and improve their profits by doing so). These different responses by different firms, then,
determines impact of offshore outsourcing on various aspect of economy such as aggregate
productivity, trade flow, number of varieties, and most importantly employment. Proposi-
tion 1 and 2 summarize the relative size of cut-off productivities.
Proposition 1 Cleansing Effect of Outsourcing The entry cut-off productivity is higher
in outsourcing equilibrium than in the initial open economy equilibrium. Also, the rise of
the entry cut-off productivity is the largest where fixed outsourcing cost (fos) is the smallest









Lemma 1 The outsourcing cut-off productivity relative to the entry cut-off productivity is the












Lemma 2 The export cut-off productivity relative to the entry cut-off productivity is the lowest
under the pattern A and the highest under the pattern C. The value for the pattern C is equal















Proof : See Appendix A.1
The first implication of Proposition 1 is that the entry cut-off productivity rises with
outsourcing regardless of the pattern of operation in the outsourcing equilibrium. This
implies that the least productive firms in the initial open economy equilibrium exit as
outsourcing becomes feasible. As prices of outsourcers decrease, non-outsourcers face a rise
in their relative prices and a fall in the demand for their products. To the firms who made
small profits in the initial open economy equilibrium, such a sales loss is enough to turn their
positive profits into negative ones, driving them out of the market. I call this the Cleansing
Effect of Offshore Outsourcing.10 The cleansing effect is directly related to the employment
level of the industry. As firms exit, all workers hired by the exiting firms lose jobs. This
implies that non-outsourcers can be a source of significant amount of outsourcing-related
job losses. In section 4, I quantify the size of the job losses due to the cleansing effect by
calibrating parameter values.
Proposition 1 also shows that the cleansing effect is larger where outsourcing is relatively
10This paper is not the first to find such an effect. Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al (2004)
theoretically show that the least productive firms exit as a country opens up for free trade or FDI.
Bernard et al (2006) closely investigates the response of U.S. manufacturing plants to the imports
from low-wage countries and find that this specific import competition raises probability of plant
death significantly. They also find that the rise of the death probability is larger for more labor-
intensive plants. More labor-intensive firms in their study are equivalent to the least productive
firms in this paper since labor is the only factor of production.
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easy (pattern A). In this case, more firms take advantage of outsourcing; therefore, the price
index goes further down. This enlarges the cleansing effect. As more firms exit under the
pattern A than under the pattern C, job destruction due to the cleansing effect is also
larger under the pattern A. Therefore, in an industry where outsourcing is relative easy to
carry out - industries with easily transferrable technology, less issue of intellectual property
right, and smaller potential variation in quantity, such as textile, apparel, and footwear -
the job destruction due to the cleansing effect is expected to be more significant. It is also
worth noting that there is a rise in the availability of outsourcing advisory services11 which
potentially reduces the fixed cost of outsourcing. This trend might expand the influence of
the cleansing effect on employment.
Proposition 2 The cut-off productivity for outsourcing is the lowest under the outsourcing






Proof : See Appendix A.2
Proposition 2 implies that outsourcing is profitable for firms with lower productivities
under the pattern A than under the pattern B or C. In other words, more firms will take
advantage of outsourcing opportunities. This is not surprising since pattern A is where the
fixed outsourcing cost is the lowest among the outsourcing equilibrium pattern A, B, and
C.
Unlike the entry cut-off productivity, export cut-off productivity does not uniformly rise
or decrease with outsourcing. Whether it increases or decreases depends on the parameter
values and the sizes of various fixed costs. Generally, though, export cut-off productivity is
low where fixed outsourcing cost is small (pattern A). This is because outsourcing benefits
11These services are provided by consulting firms such as Deloitte, EquaTerra, neoIT, PA consult-
ing group, Pace Harmon, PricewaterhouseCoopers, RampRate, and TPI.
(source: Forrester Research, Inc. http://www.forrester.com/Research/Document/Excerpt/0,7211,40655,00.html
)
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exporters more than non-exporters by bringing about a large reduction in exporters’ prices
in their foreign markets. This generates a significant rise in their revenues. Such an increase
in revenue allows firms with lower productivities to export. In other words, outsourcing
expands export opportunities; so, the export cut-off productivity is lower where outsourcing
is fairly easy. Under pattern A, all exporters are outsourcers; and even the exporter with the
lowest productivity (zAx ) , whose export profit is zero, experiences a rise its revenue. In the
absence of outsourcing, this firm’s revenue falls short of the fixed export cost; thus, it would
not export. For this reason, the export cut-off productivity falls under the pattern A. Under
the pattern C, the exporters with the lowest productivity (zCx ) is a home-producer, and its
relative price is higher in the outsourcing equilibrium. In the absence of outsourcing, this
firm makes positive profit rather than zero profit, so the xport cut-off productivity - the zero-
profit productivity for exporting) must be lower (z0x < z
C
x ). Pattern B is the intermediate
case, and the sign of the change in the export cut-off productivity is ambiguous.
3.1 Firm-level Operational Responses to Outsourcing under the Pattern
A
In this section, I briefly discuss how different firms respond to outsourcing in more
detail by presenting the case under the outsourcing equilibrium pattern A. Figure 7 depicts
the cut-off productivities of both the initial open economy equilibrium and the outsourcing
equilibrium. These cut-off productivities divide firms into five groups - (A.b) through
(A.f). The firms that fall in the range of (A.a) exit in both equilibria; therefore, they are
not relevant for the analysis. As feasibility of outsourcing results in different operational
responses for different groups of firms, the employment implications also differ across groups.
The firms in the group (A.b) are forced to exit due to the Cleansing Effect. As these firms
shut down, the workers previously employed by these firms will be laid off generating pure
job destruction. The firms in the group (A.c) survive as home-producers. I call these firms
Home-Producers. Although they do not change their operational behavior, their relative
prices rise; thus, they suffer from a decrease in sales which, in turn, results in layoffs.
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The firms in the group (A.d) are the firms that switch from being non-exporting home-
producers to non-exporting outsourcers. I call these firms New Outsourcers. The change
in the assembly location involves job destruction;however, the price reduction generates a
rise in demand. In order to meet the higher demand, these firms have to hire more workers
in their service segments creating new jobs. Thus, in this group, there will be both job
destruction and job creation. Depending on the relative size of these two effects, the net
employment effect may be either positive or negative.
The firms in the group (A.e) are New Exporters switching from being non-exporting
home-producers to exporting outsourcers. The initiation of export operation brings these
firms a whole new market, and the increase in sales due to market expansion generates a
large number of new jobs. Especially, the employment in the export operation is pure job
creation. In their domestic operations, there is job destruction as well as job creation, as
for new outsourcers.
The firms in the group (A.f) are Existing Exporters, but they move their assembly
operation to the South. In the initial equilibrium, the domestic operation accounts for
majority of their sales due to the price disadvantage that they face in their foreign markets.
As they outsource, elimination of such price disadvantage raises their foreign sales more
than their domestic sales. Thus, larger portion of job destruction occurs in their domestic
portion of job destruction occurs in their domestic sales while more jobs are created in the
export operations.
When one looks empirically at the aggregate employment Figures over time from the
period with little outsourcing to the period with a significant portion of market composed
of outsourcers, one only observes the net change in employment, which is a mixture of job
destruction and creation in different types of firms. The structural model introduced in
sections 2 enables us to separate job destruction and job creation, and the relative size of
employment changes in different groups of firms.
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3.2 Distributional Assumption
Under a certain functional assumption for the productivity distribution, G(z), we can
derive more practical implications. For the rest of the theoretical analysis and the numer-
ical analysis, I assume that the productivity draws follow a Pareto Distribution.12 The





where η > ε− 1 and z ≥ a (47)
zmin is the minimum value of z, and η is the shape parameter that determines the dis-
persion of the productivity draws. Large η implies low dispersion; that is, large mass is
concentrated at the low productivity. With small η, productivity draws are more evenly
distributed, so the chance of drawing higher productivity is larger. For this reason, the
shape parameter is crucial in determining the overall productivity level of an industry and
the cut-off productivities in equilibria. The inequality, η > ε− 1 is required for the average
productivity to be finite.
Under the Pareto distribution, the probabilities of outsourcing and exporting can be
written in a very simple form. For example, the probability of exporting in the initial open






Then, lemma 1 and 2 have direct implications on the composition of the market. They show
that both the fraction of outsourcers and exporters among domestic firms are the largest
under the pattern A and the smallest under the pattern C in the outsourcing equilibrium.
This confirms that outsourcing promotes exporting, hence, international trade.
Under this distributional assumption, k(ẑ) is a constant that is independent of ẑ. I
12used by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Bernard, Redding, and
Schott(2007), and many others.
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define k as the constant value of k(ẑ) as follows.
k = k(ẑ) =
ε− 1
η − ε + 1
(48)
Since η > ε − 1, k is positive. Using equations (47) and (48), I can rewrite equilibrium
conditions for the initial open economy equilibrium and the outsourcing equilibrium A.























Using the same derivation method that is used in deriving equation (50), we can obtain
the equivalent expression that constitute equilibrium conditions for patterns B and C as
follows.























The rank of the entry cut-off productivities shown by Proposition 1 together with the
change in the export cut-off productivities discussed in the previous section has a direct
implication on the number of varieties in each equilibrium. The following Propositions
summarize the impact of outsourcing on product varieties.
Proposition 3 The number of domestic varieties decreases as outsourcing becomes feasible.
Also, the decrease in variety is the largest where fixed outsourcing cost (fos) is the smallest








Proposition 4 Outsourcing Reduces Variety: The total number number of varieties
available to consumers decreases as outsourcing becomes feasible.
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max{ MAt ,MBt ,MCt } < M0t
Proof : See Appendix A.3 and A.4
Proposition 3 implies, first, that the number of domestic varieties decrease with outsourc-
ing, and second, that the decrease in domestic varieties gets larger as outsourcing intensifies.
Under the outsourcing equilibrium pattern A - the equilibrium with the greatest extent of
outsourcing activities - there are fewer domestic varieties than any other equilibrium. This
is due to the cleansing effect. As shown in Proposition 1, the magnitude of the cleansing
effect is large where outsourcing is relatively easy to undertake. Therefore, more domestic
firms are driven out of the market under pattern A.
Unlike domestic varieties, the number of imported varieties (same as the number of
exporters) does not uniformly increase or decrease. The pattern of increase and decrease
resembles that of the export cut-off productivities. The number of imported varieties un-
der the outsourcing equilibrium pattern A is larger than that of the initial open economy
equilibrium (MAx > M
0
x). Since outsourcing benefits exporters more than non-exporters,
the relative easiness of outsourcing promotes exporting very much. Under the pattern C,
low-productivity exporters are not outsourcers, and outsourcing generates the cleansing-
like effect on home-producing exporters as well. As price index falls in both markets due
to outsourcing, home-producing exporters face a rise in their relative prices in their foreign
markets. Some firms’ profits turn negative and they have to exit. In the process, the num-
ber of imported varieties decreases (MCx < M
0
x). The pattern B is the intermediate case,
and the sign of the change in the number of imported varieties is ambiguous.
Proposition 4 summarizes the changes in the numbers of domestic and imported vari-
eties. It states that the total number of varieties that are available to consumers unam-
biguously falls as outsourcing becomes feasible. This is rather surprising since the increase
in product variety is often discussed as one of the most important gains from international
trade. This negative effect of outsourcing on product variety is a result of the cleansing
effect. Especially under the outsourcing equilibrium pattern A, the number of imported
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varieties rises; but the decrease in domestic product variety due to the cleansing effect
dominates the rise in imported product variety, resulting a net decrease in total product
variety.
Since death of firms causes massive job destruction, the changes in product varieties
summarized by Propositions 3 and 4 have important implications on the employment effect
of outsourcing. However, the total impact should include changes within firms - sales loss of
surviving home-producers, layoffs by outsourcers, and sales expansion of outsourcers. The
next section presents the employment effect of outsourcing.
3.3 Employment
Total employment of an industry consists of production employment by active firms
and the investment made by new entrants. The production employment, then, consists
of assembly, services and fixed cost employment of home-producers, outsourcers, exporters
and non-exporters. Since each equilibrium - the initial open economy equilibrium and
three outsourcing equilibrium patterns - is composed of different groups of firms, the total
employment should be calculated separately. In this section, I presents the initial open
economy equilibrium, and the outsourcing equilibrium pattern A. Employment under the
patterns B an dC resemble that of the pattern A.
3.3.1 Initial Open Economy Equilibrium
There are two types of firms in this equilibrium - non-exporting home-producers and ex-
porting home-producers. We can separate these firms’ operations into two categories: first,
domestic operation by home-producers and, second, export operation by home-producers.
M0d firms - firms with z ≥ z0hp - serve domestic markets and each firm’s labor requirement for
domestic operation is the same as equation (6). Total employment for domestic operations
can be obtained by multiplying the number of firms, M0d to the average labor requirement
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by these firms, which is as follows.




qd,hp(.) is the quantity of domestic sales and is defined by equation (2). M0x firms - firms
with z ≥ z0x - export, and the average labor requirement of these firms’ export operation is
as follows.

















The entry investment employment is M0e fe where M
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e is the number of new entrants
each period in the equilibrium. In the steady state, number of successful entry each period







the entry investment employment is, using equation (49),
M0e fe = M
0
d π̄











Equation (56) implies that the total amount of resources used as entry investment is equal
to the total profit of active firms. This ensures that the industry as a whole yields zero profit
in the equilibrium. Now, the total employment in the initial open economy equilibrium is
sum of equations (55) and (56).












































Emp0 denotes total employment in this industry in the initial open economy equilibrium.
In order to simplify further, I assume that the total labor compensation is eual to the total
expenditure in this industry in the initial employment. Since the wage rate is 1, Emp0 must
be R. Then, the total initial employment in this industry, equation (57), can be re-written
as the following:











3.3.2 Outsourcing Equilibrium Pattern A
There are three types of firms in this equilibrium: nont-exporting home-producers, non-
exporting outsourcers, and exporting outsourcers. Their operations can be divided into
three categories; first, home-producers’ domestic operation; second, outsourcers’ domestic
operation; and finally, outsourcers’ export operation. There are MAhp home-producers and
their productivities lie between zAhp and z
A
os. Their average productivity, z̃
A
hp, is described
by equation (38). The average number of workers haired by their domestic operation is as
follows.




MAos firms, whose productivities are such that z ≥ zAos, outsource and serve their domestic
markets. Their assembly segments are sent to the South, and the final product need to be
shipped from the South; therefore, the average labor requirement for these firms’ domestic
operation is




Similary, each outosurcer’ export operation - carried out by MAx firms - requires the following
number of workers on average.













x )). The entry investment employment is again M
A
e fe; and, in the steady state
37






d . From equation (50), the entry
investment employment in the outsourcing equilibrium pattern A is as follows.


































































In a similar manner, we can obtain toal employment in the outsourcing equilibrium patterns
B and C.
3.3.3 Employment Effect of Outsourcing
The analysis of the impact of outsourcing on employment requires comparison between
total initial employment and total employment in the outsourcing equilibrium employment.
The ratio between two total employment can be obtained using equations (58), (63), (A.3.2),




























































: equations (17) & (18)
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The last term, 1ε , represents the employment for fixed costs and the entry investment.
This implies that the number of workers hired for fixed costs and entry investment is, from
equation (58), constant at Rε which is the markup portion of the total revenue in this
industry. This means that the total expenditure in this industry goes entirely to workers -
both Northern and Southern workers - as a compensation.





indicates the variable cost portion of employment.





is equal to one, outsourcing has no impact on total employ-
ment. The second part of the first tem - the ratio between two entry cut-off productivities
- represents the cleansing effect. As zAhp is larger than z
0
hp, employment in the outsourcing
equilibrium decrease. The terms in the curly bracket is the comparison of average firm-level
employment.
Using equation (64) and the equivalent expressions for the outsourcing equilibrium pat-
terns B and C, I can summarize the effect of outsourcing on total employment of the subject
industry in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Outsourcing Results in Net Job Loss: Outsourcing unambiguously
reduces the aggregate employment.
EmpA < EmpB < EmpC < Emp0
15from Appendix 3









which is obtained from equations (A.3.2), (A.3.3), (49),
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Proof: See Appendix A.5
EmpB and EmpC denote total employment levels under the outsourcing equilib-
rium patterns B and C. Proposition 5 strongly suggest that outsourcing does hurt
employment at the aggregate level regardless of the difficulty of outsourcing. Different
groups of firms (as seen in Figure 7) destroy and create different amount of jobs under
different patterns; but the sum of various employment responses is always negative.
4 Numerical Analyses
Proposition 5 may serve as a supporting argument for the public concern that out-
sourcing destroys U.S. manufacturing jobs. However, the blame by the public is very
concentrated on the outsourcing firms rather than the whole economy. As shown by
Proposition 1 and Figure 7, there are firms that exit due to lack of competitiveness
and, they generate pure job destruction which could possibly explain the negative
employment effect. Whether outsourcing firms alone bring out net employment loss
requires further investigation. For this purpose, I perform various numerical analyses
to quantify the employment implications of different groups of firms, and their job
destruction and creation separately. This provides valuable information on the em-
ployment dynamics that is not observable without very detailed operational data on
every firm in the economy.
4.1 Calibration
There are six parameters in this model, transport cost (τ), relative Southern efficiency
wage (δ), employment share of the service segment (γ), marginal production cost of
outsourcers relative to home producers (λ), elasticity of substitution (ε), and the
shape parameter of Pareto distribution (η).
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First, τ=1.3 is chosen from Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). Their estimate of
international transport cost is equivalent of a 70% ad valorem tariff rate (τ=1.7). Out
of this 70%, 30% is variable cost (physical transit cost, time cost of transit, and tariffs)
and the remaining 40% is border-related cost (language, currency, information, and
security). Since I have a fixed cost of exporting in addition to transport cost, I take
30% of the tariff-equivalent transport cost for the analyses. Second, δ=0.5 is chosen
from the data on manufacturing wage and productivity of the US (from Bureau of
Economic Analysis, BEA) and Mexico (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia,
INEGI) for 2000.17 Third, the 2002 Census of Manufactures reports that the share
of non-production workers in US manufacturing employment is 29.6%. I use γ=0.3.
Fourth, λ is simply a combination of δ and γ, equation (27), with δ=0.5 and γ=0.3
implying that λ=0.65.
Fifth, Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate various elasticities for different aggre-
gation levels (3-, 4-, 5-digit) of SITC manufacturing industry classifications (Rev.2 for
1972-1988, Rev.3 for 1990-2001). I use the estimates of 4-digit SITC for the period
1990-2001 whose median is 2.53 and mean is 5.88. The high value of the mean is
due to a few outliers. For the analyses, I choose ε=3. Lastly, η=4 is chosen for the
shape parameter of Pareto distribution. For this, I match the model’s prediction on
the market share of imports of the initial open economy equilibrium to the 1992 US
manufacturing industry. According to BEA’s report, imports accounted for 18.08%
of the US manufacturing market in 1992. The model’s prediction gives us a range
of market share of imports for different size of fixed export cost rather than a single
value. The range that includes 18.08% is generated by η=4.
17Chinese efficiency wage was 40% of the US in 2000. Data source: National Bureau of Statistics
of China
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4.2 Net Employmnet Effect
The total employment includes the production workers - assembly and service workers,
workers hired as fixed production cost, fixed export cost, and fixed outsourcing cost
- and the entry investment employment - the sunk entry cost portion of employment.
In the equilibrium, the entry investment employment accounts for 17% of the total
initial employment under the benchmark set of parameters.
Figure 8 shows the net employment change as a share of total initial employment.
Panel (a) presents the entire α − β space.18 It tells us that for very small β, the
economy loses up to 36% of its initial employment. As can be seen by equation
(64), (A.5.1), and (A.5.2),19 the fixed and sunk costs portion of employment is a
fixed share of total initial employment regardless of equilibrium; so the employment
response shown in Figure 8 comes solely from the changes in the numbers of assembly
and service workers.
Panel (a) also tells us that the net employment loss depends greatly on the size
of β and relatively little on the size of α. As β increases - as outsourcing becomes
more difficult - the net employment loss decreases dramatically. In this model, the
feasibility of outsourcing is the only shock to the economy. Where outsourcing is
very difficult (large β), the feasibility alone is not enough to induce many firms to
outsource. As smaller number of firms outsource, the overall effect of outsourcing
on the economy is also small, resulting in a smaller net job loss. Panel (b) presents
net employment effect for selected values of alpha. This shows the dependency of
employment response on the size of β more clearly. Net employment effect approaches
to zero where β is very large, but never becomes positive. Overall, the net job loss is
quite sizeable for reasonable value of β.
In order to understand the net employment effect of outsourcing better, we need to
look at it at more disaggregate level. Figure 9 presents the net employment effect of





five different groups of firms under the Pattern A discussed in Figure 7. The vertical
axes show the size of employment change as a share of total initial employment.
Overall, the employment effects of different groups of firms differ dramatically in
signs, sizes, and shapes. These diagrams show that analysis of only the aggregate
employment change unintentionally discards a lot of valuable information. Panel (a)
is the net employment effect for all firms and is identical to Figure 8. Also, summing
panels (b) to (f) of Figure 9 yields panel (a).
The most noticeable features are the negative employment effect of the cleansing
effect. As can be seen by comparing the units of measurement along the vertical
axes, the magnitude is overwhelmingly large compared to other groups’ employment
effects. Other firm groups show different responses to offshore outsourcing, but their
magnitudes are all small relative to that of the cleansing effect. For the benchmark
parameters, non-exporting outsourcers - New Outsourcers, panel (d) - and exporting
outsourcers who previously exported - Existing Exporters, panel (f) - fail to create
net job gain. The increase in sales is not large enough to offset the layoffs of assem-
bly workers. New exporters, on the other hand, create more jobs than they destroy.
Although the magnitude is small, it shows that one of the major benefits of offshore
outsourcing is that it gives some of outsourcers the opportunity to expand their busi-
ness to foreign market. Overall, the net job loss that outsourcing brings about is
driven by job destruction due to the cleansing effect; and, its negative effect is some-
what offset by the net job creation of new exporters who are give then opportunities
to export due to the price reduction from outsourcing.
Patterns B and C do not share the same categorization of firms as presented in
Figure 7. However, in all equilibria, firms can be categorized into three major groups.
First, Cleansing Effect - the firms that initially were non-exporting home-producers
who then are forced to exit in the outsourcing equilibrium; second, Home-Producers
- home-producers that survive and choose not to outsource regardless of their export
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orientation; and finally, Outsourcers - outsourcing firms regardless of their export
orientation. For pattern A, the group (A.b) Cleansing Effect belongs to the firm group
Cleansing Effect for obvious reason. The group (A.c) Home-Producers belongs to the
firm group Home-Producers, the rest of firms, group (A.d) New Outsourcers, (A.e)
New Exporters, and (A.f) Existing Exporters, belong to the firm group Outsourcers.
The export orientation of Home-Producers changes across patterns. For instance,
no home-producers in pattern A export, but some in pattern C do. There are non-
exporting as well as exporting outsourcers in pattern A, but all outsourcers export in
pattern C.
Figure 10 presents the net employment effect of the cleansing effect, home-producers,
and outsourcers for the entire α − β space. The cleansing effect again shows dom-
inance in magnitude. One can also notice the resemblance of the net employment
of the cleansing effect alone - panel (a) - to panel (a) of Figure 8. This confirms
the dominance of the cleansing effect in driving the overall effect of outsourcing on
total employment. The effect of home-producers is generally small. The net em-
ployment effect of outsourcers is very negative for very small β, but the magnitude
decreases rapidly as β rises, and in fact becomes positive for a certain range of α
and β. This implies that job creation of outsourcers exceeds their job destruction in
that range. Overall, the net employment loss by outsourcers is less than 10% of total
initial employment, and is smaller for relatively large values of β.
Figure 9, and 10, strongly suggest the dominance of the cleansing effect in em-
ployment responses to offshore outsourcing. In an attempt to summarize, Figure 11
shows the net employment loss due to the cleansing effect as a share of total net em-
ployment effect for selected values of α. Job destruction due to cleansing effect takes
up to 70-75% of total net employment loss for small value of β, and more than 50%
for the most range of α and β. As β rises, the cleansing effect gets quite small (panel
(a), Figure 10); however, total net job loss also decreases, keeping the fraction of it
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due to the cleansing effect approximately constant after β = 20. The lower bound for
the value of beta for the values of alpha shown is around 45%.
One might wonder whether the dominance of the cleansing effect in outsourcing-
related employment response is specific to the parameter values chosen for the bench-
mark case. Figure 12 presents the net employment effect for various deviations from
the benchmark parameter values. The first column shows the total net employment
effect, the second column is that due to the cleansing effect, and the last column is
that of survivors. All figures are relative to the total initial employment, so that the
sum of the second and third columns yields the first column. These figures show
how total net employment effect change and how significant the cleansing effect is in
driving the aggregate net employment change for different sets of parameter values.
Figure 13 shows the cleansing effect as a share of total net employment effect for the
six sets of parameter values that are analyzed in Figure 12.
There are three main messages that we can learn from Figures 12 and 13. First,
the dominance of the cleansing effect in employment response to offshore outsourcing
is preserved for various sets of parameter values. This is easier to see in Figure 13.
The cleansing effect takes up significant portion of total employment loss in all six
cases although the size varies across different parameter values used. In panel (b)
and (d), job destruction from cleansing effect exceeds the total net employment loss.
In these two cases, survivors together generate net gain of jobs for a certain values of
α and β. In panel (a) and (e), the cleansing effect is smaller, but still is more than
18% of total net employment loss.
Second, as mentioned briefly above, survivors generate net employment gain for
some parameter values. Panel (d) shows the most significant job gain. This is where
the Southern wage rate is very low relative to Northern wage rate. Lower Southern
wage rate is directly related to the size of benefits that one firm can realize from
relocating its assembly segment. Outsourcing lowers outsourcers price very much,
45
in turn raises their sales volume very much. Outsourcers have to newly hire large
number of service workers in order to meet the massive increase in sales.
Third, total net employment effect is always very negative. This is the case even
when there is significant amount of job creation by outsourcers - as in panel (d). The
cleansing effect is always significantly large to more than offset the job creation. This
can be easily explained why. Where the benefit from outsourcing is very large, so
outsourcers generate large amount of new jobs, more firms will want to outsource.
As a result, the overall price level falls greatly, more of home-producers with low
productivity will eventually be driven out of market; thus, larger cleansing effect.
Whenever outsourcing affect the market in a larger scale, the cleansing effect gets
larger as well, generating net loss of employment in any case.
Besides the three major points, Figures 12 and 13 convey a lot of valuable in-
formation about outsourcing. The labor market responses to offshore outsourcing in
their magnitude and the sensitivity to the size of fixed export and outsourcing costs
differ across different sets of parameter values. In comparison between panels (a) and
(b), the job destruction due to the cleansing effect of small shape parameter of Pareto
distribution is much less sensitive to the value of β. From panel (a) and (b) of Figure
13, we can also see that in the case of small shape parameter, the cleansing effect ac-
counts for much smaller portion of total net employment effect. Under a small shape
parameter (η), productivity draws are more evenly distributed. Therefore, more firms
belong to the groups of outsourcers and home-producers, and less firms belong to the
group of the cleansing effect compared to the case with high η. A smaller number
of firms in the cleansing effect group directly implies smaller job destruction due to
the cleansing effect. Where η is high, large mass is concentrated at the bottom of
productivity spectrum, so there are more firms in the cleansing effect group, and less
firms in the groups home-producers and outsourcers.
The high sensitivity of the net employment effect under high η also stems from
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the high concentration of firms at low productivity. Where outsourcing is very easy
(very low β), the cut-off productivity for outsourcing is low enough to reach the
range of productivity with significant mass of firms. In this case, outsourcing affects
substantial portion of the market; and, the large fall in price index will generate large
cleansing effect, and hence, large change in employment. However, since the mass is
so concentrated at the bottom of productivity spectrum, it requires a very small value
of β to generate this result. For a reasonably high value of β, the cut-off productivity
for outsourcing would not be low enough to induce a lot of outsourcing activity. The
market is simply not affected by outsourcing much in this case, generating very small
employment response as can be seen in panel (b) in Figure 12.
Panels (c) and (d) present the sensitivity of employment responses to the size of
Southern wage rate, δ. Southern wage rate determines the attractiveness of outsourc-
ing. Under the benchmark parameter value (δ = 0.5 ↔ λ = 0.65), the price reduction
from outsourcing is 15% for domestic sales (τλ = 0.845) and 35% for foreign sales
(lambda = 0.65). Given τ =1.3, δ = 0.6 - panel (c) - implies that the price reduction
for domestic sales is only 6% (τλ = 0.936) and that for foreign sales is 28% (λ = 0.72).
There is very small incentive to outsource if a firm does not export. Outsourcing is
still attractive to exporters because of the elimination of price disadvantage in their
foreign market. Therefore, there are outsourcing firms, but less than in the case
with small δ. Also, the effect of outsourcing on the price index is small since the
price reduction from it is small. For this reason, the overall employment response is
also small - small cleansing effect, small net employment loss by survivors, and hence,
small total net employment loss. On the other hand, δ = 0.3 - panel (d) - implies 34%
price reduction for domestic sales and 49% price reduction for foreign sales. Small δ
enlarges the benefit of outsourcing, outsourcers generate net employment gain. The
job creation is so big, the net employment effect of survivors is still positive even after
combining job destruction from home-producers. However, as discussed above, the
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attractiveness induces large number of firms to outsource, lowering the price index
by much, thus raising the magnitude of the cleansing effect. Despite the large net
employment gain by survivors, the total net employment effect is still negative due
to the large cleansing effect.
Panel (e) shows the net employment effect under high elasticity of substitution
(ε). The cleansing effect is the smallest among the six cases studied in Figures 12
and 13 in terms of its share of total net employment loss. High ε means that con-
sumers are more price-sensitive. In the initial open economy equilibrium, low price
(high productivity) firms serve larger share of the market with high η, hence, em-
ploy larger portion of the total employment. This implies less workers are hired by
firms in the cleansing effect group. Thus, the cleansing effect from outsourcing re-
sults in smaller number of job destruction. Despite the smaller cleansing effect, the
net employment loss under high ε is very large. This is driven by large job losses of
survivors. This is somewhat counter-intuitive since high elasticity is often translated
into larger consumption switch in response to price reduction. The price reduction
from outsourcing is expected to generates large sales gain, thus, large job creation.
However, there is another dimension to consider. Outsourcers employ large numbers
of assembly workers as well as service workers in the initial equilibrium. As they
outsource, the number of workers they outsource is also very large; and in this case
the larger job destruction dominates the large job creation that high ε brings about.
Also, the sensitivity of consumer response to outsourcers’ price reduction reduces the
sales of home-producers whose relative prices rise. Home-producers are significant
source of job destruction in this case.
Panel (f) shows the effect of size of transport cost (τ) in employment response.
The size of τ also affects the incentive to outsource. Given δ = 0.5 (λ = 0.65),
τλ = 0.715, meaning 28% price reduction for domestic sales, and 35% price reduction
for foreign sales. The interesting thing to notice in this case is the disparity between
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panel (f) and (d). Both small δ and small τ increases the price reduction, but the net
employment effects of survivors in two cases are vastly different. This is because how
τ and δ raise the attractiveness of outsourcing are fundamentally different. Small
value of τ is relevant for both the initial equilibrium and the outsourcing equilibrium,
while δ is only relevant to the outsourcing equilibrium. Small τ means that the price
disadvantage that an exporter faces in the initial equilibrium is small; hence, exporting
is more profitable. Therefore, there would be more exporters in the initial equilibrium;
and, those exporters employ more workers to serve larger quantities in their foreign
market than in the case with high τ . As exporters are the high productivity firms,
they are more likely to belong to the group of outsourcers than non-exporters. As
outsourcing becomes feasible and these firms relocate their assembly segment to the
South, their job destruction is larger since they initially employed more workers - in
assembly as well as service segment. Therefore, low τ brings more job destruction by
outsourcers than low δ. Also, low δ has larger price reduction for foreign sales than
low τ although the price reduction for domestic sales is similar. So, outsourcing with
low δ creates more jobs than with low τ . As a result, the net employment effect of
survivors in panel (d) is positive while that in panel (f) is very negative.
To sum up, the cleansing effect plays a dominant role in generating net employ-
ment loss from outsourcing. This should not be interpreted as that outsourcers are
not responsible for the unemployments that workers experience in the wake of off-
shore outsourcing. It should rather be interpreted as that when we measure the
employment responses to outsourcing, we should not only focus on the employment
changes within outsourcing firms and that the workers employed by non-outsourcers
and, more importantly, the firms who disappear due to lack of competitiveness in the
outsourcing equilibrium are very much affected and should be the subject of analyses.
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4.3 Job Destruction and Creation
If the purpose of all the attempts that we make to measure the labor market implica-
tions of offshore outsourcing is to prepare proper policy tools to reduce the adjustment
costs of laid-off workers, it is particularly important to measure the size of job de-
struction. It is often the case, in the manufacturing sector, that employment is not
only decreasing, the composition of employment is moving toward a higher ratio of
high-skilled jobs. This is especially true for outsourcing-related layoffs. Since la-
bor cost reduction is the major benefit of outsourcing, firms tend to send the most
low-skilled and labor-intensive parts of their businesses abroad. For this reason, the
displaced workers are not readily employable in the newly created jobs that tend to
be high-skilled managerial tasks.
Even if labor is quite mobile across occupations, correctly measuring the amount
of job destruction is still of great importance in regard to the length of unemployment.
Every job loss involves a period of unemployment, and the length of unemployment
depends greatly on the availability of vacancies in the economy. As jobs are destroyed
due to offshore outsourcing - from various sources; the cleansing effect, sales loss of
home-producers, and relocation of assembly segment by outsourcers -, new jobs are
also created by outsourcers. These jobs will absorb fraction of unemployment gener-
ated by outsourcing. Under the assumption that workers are perfectly mobile between
assembly and services, the size of job destruction is the total number of unemploy-
ment. The size of job creation indicates the number of temporary unemployment,
and the difference between total number of job destruction and creation, which is
total net employment loss that is presented in Figure 8, measures the number of per-
manent employment. Again, if establishment of proper labor policy is the concern,
the policy tool for permanent displacement should be different from that for tempo-
rary unemployment. For that, separate measurement of permanent and temporary
unemployment is crucial.
50
Figure 14 compares the total net employment, total job destruction, and total job
creation. While the net job loss is up to 36% of initial employment, job destruction
and creation separately reach up to 59% and 23% of initial employment. This shows
that looking only at net employment effect discard a lot of valuable information on
changes in the labor market. According to Figure 14, 59% of workers lose their jobs.
39% of these job losses (23% of all workers) are temporary, and the rest, 61%, are of
permanent nature.
Figure 15 presents decomposition of the job destruction caused by outsourcing.
Panel (a) shows the total job destruction which is identical to panel (b) of Figure 14.
Panel (b) is job destruction due to the cleansing effect and identical to panel (a) of
Figure 10 in magnitude. Figure 16 presents job destruction due to the cleansing effect
as a share of total job destruction. Where β is small, the cleansing effect accounts
for 30-40% of total job destruction, then decreases as β increases. However, even for
larger β, the cleansing effect is around 30% of total job destruction. Panel (c) of
Figure 15 shows the job destruction by surviving home-producers. For a very small
value of β, nearly every surviving firm outsources, leaving a small number of firms
to stay as home-producers. The size of job destruction by home-producers is also
small for that reason. Except when β is very small, the magnitude of this type of job
destruction is rather constant at around 2-4% of initial employment. As β increases,
the number of home-producers rises, but the impact of outsourcing on the price level
gets smaller; therefore, each firm loses smaller number of workers. This together
with rising number of home-producers maintains the relatively constant size of job
destruction.
Panel (d) shows job destruction caused by outsourcers’ relocation of assembly seg-
ment. It depends largely on the value of β because it determines how many firms
outsource. The more firms outsource, the more assembly workers are let go. One
should notice that outsourcers’ job destruction is larger than the cleansing effect.
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Although the analysis of net employment effect in the previous section finds the dom-
inance of the cleansing effect, layoffs by outsourcers account for larger portion of the
total unemployment caused by offshore outsourcing. In terms of net employment
effect, new jobs that they create offset a fraction of their large number of layoffs
(sometimes more than offset as seen in panel (d) of Figure 12), making their net em-
ployment loss smaller than the cleansing effect (again, they may bring net job gain).
The smaller net job loss of outsourcers does not means that the new jobs created
by outsourcers are filled by the workers displaced by outsourcers; therefore the job
destruction by outsourcers is not less important than the cleansing effect. Rather,
the cleansing effect includes both assembly and service workers while outsourcers’
layoffs only include assembly workers. If labor is not perfectly mobile between seg-
ments, the service workers who are laid off due to the cleansing effect will be more
easily reemployed to fill up the new service jobs created by outsourcers. However,
the unemployment of the assembly workers who are laid off by outsourcers is more
permanent.
Figure 16 shows the size of job destruction due to the cleansing effect and that
due to the relocation of assembly segments by outsourcers as a share of total job
destruction. Two panels confirm that outsourcers’ job destruction is larger than what
the cleansing effect brings about. According to panel (b), outsourcers’ layoffs account
for more than half of total job destruction cause by outsourcing where outsourcing
is relatively easy to undertake (small β). For larger value of β, outsourcers’ job
destruction accounts for 40 - 50% of total job destruction. Panel (a) of figure 16 can
be compared to figure 12. We can clearly see that the significance of the cleansing
effect is substantially reduced in the context of job destruction alone, compared to
that of total net employment effect.
It is also interesting to see how jobs are created by outsourcers. Figure 17 presents
job creation by different type of outsourcers under Pattern A. Recall that, under the
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pattern A, there are New Outsourcers - non-exporting outsourcers that used to be
non-exporting home-producers, New Exporters - exporting outsourcers that used to
be non-exporting home-producers, and Existing Exporters - exporting outsourcers
that used to be exporting home-producers. Since pattern A requires the smallest
value of β, it includes largest number of outsourcers and more types outsourcers
(three, more precisely) than other patterns. The total job creation is between 9-
23% of initial employment, and new exporters’ job creation - panel (c) - accounts for
more than 60% of it (7-14% of initial employment). Where β is very small, and α is
relatively large, new outsourcers - panel (b) - generate sizeable job creation because
more firms belong to this category. This Figure shows that the expansion of export
opportunity due to outsourcing is very important benefit of offshore outsourcing.
5 Conclusion
As outsourcing becomes feasible, some - not all - firms start outsourcing their assembly
segment to the South where the wage rate is only a fraction of the Northern one. The
overall price level decreases, and competition gets fiercer. As a result, the minimum
productivity required to survive in the market rises, forcing large number of firms
who operated at the bottom of the productivity spectrum out of the market. This is
called the cleansing effect of offshore outsourcing. The surviving firms choose either to
stay as home-producers or to start outsourcing. Home-producers destroy jobs as their
relative prices rise and demand decreases. Outsourcers lay off assembly workers, but
they create new service jobs as their demand rises due to price reduction. Outsourcing
allows some firms to expand their operations from only their home market to their
foreign market. These firms realize the largest benefits from outsourcing. At the
aggregate level, various employment responses to outsourcing together generate a net
loss of employment in all cases. Outsourcing also reduces the number of product
varieties available for consumption.
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The numerical analysis confirms the theoretical finding that outsourcing unam-
biguously reduces the aggregate employment. The net employment loss under the
benchmark parameter values, which is calibrated to match various moments of the
data, reaches up to 36% of total initial employment. This negativity of employment
effect stems mostly from the cleansing effect. As a large number of small firms exit,
they let go of all of their workers. Such job destruction accounts for 50-75% of the
aggregate net employment loss. The sensitivity analysis shows that the dominance
of the cleansing effect in driving the negative net employment effect is not specific to
the benchmark parameter values and is rather a general result.
The numerical analysis also supports the previous empirical finding that the net
employment effect of outsourcing firms is ambiguous. Under the benchmark param-
eter values, the net effect could be negative or positive depending on the difficulty of
outsourcing. It ranges from 17% net loss to a net gain that is equivalent to 3% of the
initial employment. Sensitivity analysis confirms the ambiguity of the employment
effect of outsourcers. For different parameter values that are studied, the employment
effect could be very negative (32% net employment loss) or significantly positive (12%
of net gain).
The separate analysis of job destruction and creation shows that analysis of the net
employment effect alone throws away a lot of valuable information. The net employ-
ment change of up to 36% of total initial employment is sum of total job destruction
up to 60% and total job creation up to 24%. Investigation of job destruction alone
shows the significance of outsourcers’ layoffs. The layoffs by outsourcers account for
45-55% of total job destruction under the benchmark parameters while the cleansing
effect accounts for 29-42%.
Economists always acknowledge the fact that there are winners and losers of in-
ternational trade, and it is also the case for offshore outsourcing. The winners in this
context are the outsourcing firms, who enjoy a rise in their profits, and the service
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workers, who enjoy more employment opportunity. In this partial equilibrium model,
the Northern wage is fixed at one; however, in reality, the rise in demand for service
(skilled) workers will raise their wage rate while it lowers the wage rate of assembly
(low-skilled) workers. In this model, it is also assumed that labor is perfectly mobile
between assembly and service segments. However, this is generally not the case. In
order to reduce the adjustment costs of the displaced assembly workers, proper un-
employment policy tools should be prepared. As discussed above, outsourcing causes
permanent as well as temporary unemployment. In order to establish an unemploy-
ment policy that serves both types of unemployment, the correct measure of the size
of each type of unemployment is a prerequisite.
The results of the numerical analysis emphasize the inadequacy of currently avail-
able datasets in evaluating the aggregate labor market dynamics - gross rather than
net - that outsourcing brings out. It also calls for a more detailed and thorough dataset
on the outsourcing activities of U.S. manufacturing firms. The dataset should include
the entire manufacturing sector rather than multinational firms alone. It should also
convey the number of layoffs and new hires of production and non-production workers
separately. Detailed operational information of outsourcers will help us establish a
meaningful measure of industry-level outsourcing activities which then can be used
to measure the levels of competitive pressure that non-outsourcers face.
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Appendix. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Equation (36) shows the outsourcing cut-off productivity as a function of the entry
cut-off productivity for outsourcing equilibrium pattern A. The outsourcing cut-off
























The sizes of fixed costs differ across patterns. Figure 6 shows the range of α (= fx/f)
And β (= fos/f) that correspond to each pattern. That is,














pattern C: {τ ε−1 [2(τλ)1−ε − 1]− 1}α ≤ β


















Equation (46) ensures that the first inequality is valid, and equation (L.1.3) proves
Lemma 3. q.e.d.
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A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Equations (14) and (36) show the export cut-off productivities as functions of the
corresponding entry cut-off productivities for the initial equilibrium and outsourcing





















Equations (L.1.1) and (L.2.1) show that zBx = z
B























Then, equations (14), (36), (L.2.2), and (L.2.3) prove Lemma 4. q.e.d.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of this Proposition utilizes the method that is used in Melitz (2003), Ap-
pendix B. The qulibrium conditions for the initial open economy - equations (26) -






















k(zAx ) = ξfe(A.1.2)


























k(zCx ) = ξfe(A.1.4)
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I define the following function.
j(x) = [1−G(x)] k(x) (A.1.5)
Using equations (16) and (23), we know that j(x) is nonnegative, and is decreasing







Using equation (A.1.5), I rewrite equations (A.3.1) - (A.3.4) as follows.
j(z0hp)f + j(z
0















x )fx = ξfe (A.1.9)
Equations (14), (36), (L.1.1), (L.2.1), and (L.2.2) show that all cut-off productivities
are linear functions of their corresponding entry cut-off productivities. Therefore,














hp, are all equal. Then, from














Then, since j(x) is decreasing in x, the left-hand side equation (A.1.7) is the largest,
followed by (A.1.8) and (A.1.9). The left-hand side of equation (A.1.6) is the smallest.
This is contradiction since the right-hand side of four equations are equal. In order
to achieve the equality of left-hand and right-hand side for all equations, the size of
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This proves Proposition 1. q.e.d.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose the outsourcing productivity cut-offs are the same under the outsourcing

















j(zAx ) < j(z
B
x ) < j(z
C
x )
These rankings imply that the left-hand side of equation (A.1.7) is smaller than that
of equation (A.1.8), which in turn is smaller than that of equation (A.1.9). This is a
contradiction since the right-hand sides of equations (A.1.7) - (A.1.9) are the same.








A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
In initial equilibrium, average revenue for an active firm is
r̄0 = ε
[








Since total revenue is fixed at R, equations (A.3.1) and (49) provide the number of
















We can obtain equivalent expressions for outsourcing equilibrium patterns A, B, and























Using equations (A.3.2), (A.3.3), and the equivalent expressions for patterns B and


























































































Using lemmas 3 and 4, I can show that equations (A.3.4) - (A.3.6) are less than 1,
which then proves Proposition 3. q.e.d.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.
For the proof, I compare total number of available varieties of each outsourcing equi-
librium pattern to that of the initial equilibrium. Firs, let us look at the outsourcing
equilibrium pattern A.
(a) Proof of MAt < M
0
t
The entry cut-off productivity under the pattern A, zAhp, is home-producers’ zero
profit productivity of entry as described by equation (12). Then, combining equations









z̃At is defined by equation (37). Substituting equation (38) into equation (37), then
























































































x . Then, the term in the square
bracket of equation (A.4.4) is a weighted average of 1 and fx
f
. Equivalently, the
first two terms in the square bracket of equation (A.4.3) is also a weighted average
of 1 and fx
f
. Again, recall that the outsourcing equilibrium pattern A corresponds
to equilibrium b in figure 6. According to table 1, equilibrium b is obtained where




According to lemma 2, the fraction of exporters among domestic firms is larger in
the outsourcing equilibrium pattern A than in the initial open economy equilibrium.







Equation (A.4.5) and the fact that fx
f
> 1 proves that the first two terms in the square


















Therefore, MAt < M
0
t . q.e.d.







The equivalent expressions for equation (A.4.3) for the outsourcing equilibrium
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The first two terms in the square brackets of both equations are also weighed average
of 1 and fx
f
. According to equation (46), fx
f
is always larger than 1 in the relevant






































Using the equivalent expressions of equation (A.4.1) for the patterns B and C, equa-



















A.5 Proof of Proposition 5.
We can obtain total employment as a share of total initial employment in the out-
sourcing equilibrium patterns B and C using the same methodology used to drive
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In order to prove Proposition 5, I first prove EmpA < EmpB, then EmpB < EmpC ,
and finally EmpC < Emp0.
(a) Proof of EmpA < EmpB







Using equations (64) and (A.5.1), we know that inequality (A.5.3) is satisfied if and






























Using equations (36) and (L.1.1), the right-hand side of inequality (A.5.4) can be




































The left-hand side of inequality (A.5.4) can also be re-written, using equations (47),
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From equations (A.5.5) and (A.5.6), we know that inequality (A.5.4) holds as long as
γ is larger than λ. However, equation (27) shows that γ < λ by definition. This is
contradiction. Therefore, EmpA must be smaller than EmpB. q.e.d.
(b) Proof of EmpB < EmpC
I follow the same procedure as in the proof of EmpA < EmpB. First, let us







From equations (A.5.1) and (A.5.2), we know that inequality (A.5.7) holds if the




























We can rewrite both left-hand side - using equations (47), (51), and (52) - and
right-hand side - using equations (L.1.1) and (L.2.2), so that we obtain alternative





























































Again, from equation (27), γ is always smaller than λ. Therefore, inequality (A.5.9)
can not hold; rather, the opposite is true. Therefore, EmpB must be smaller than
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EmpC . q.e.d.
(c) Proof of EmpC < Emp0
Suppose EmpC > Emp0; then, equation (A.5.2) must be larger than 1. Notice

























Therefore, EmpC > Emp0 requires that equation (A.5.10) is larger than 1. Using
equations (14), (47), (49), (50), (L.1.1), and (L.2.2), I can rewrite equation (A.5.10)










































This can be simplified to γ > λ, which is a contradiction. Therefore, EmpC must be
smaller than Emp0. q.e.d
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Table 2.1. Relevant Parameter Values for each equilibrium
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Figure 2.1: Open Economy Equilibrium
Figure 2.2: Transportation Structure
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Figure 2.3: Total Profit Functions of Outsourcers
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Figure 2.4: Twelve Equilibria under Outsourcing (1)
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Figure 2.4: Twelve Equilibria under Outsourcing (2)
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Figure 2.5: Various Patterns of Outsourcing in Outsourcing Equilibria
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Figure 2.6: Equilibrium Space
Figure 2.7: Different Operational Responses by Different Group of Firms under Pattern A
73
Figure 2.8: Total Net Employment Effect
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Figure 2.9: Net Employment Effect by various firm groups under the Pattern A
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Figure 2.10: Net Employment Effect: Cleansing Effect, Home-Producers, and Outsourcers
Figure 2.11: Cleansing Effect as a Share of Total Net Employment Effect
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Figure 2.12: Various Deviations from Benchmark Parameters (1)
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Figure 2.12: Various Deviations from Benchmark Parameters (2)
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Figure 2.13: Cleansing Effect as a Share of Total Net Employment Loss
Various Deviations from Benchmark Parameters
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Figure 2.14: Net Employment Effect, Job Destruction, and Job Creation
Figure 2.15: Decomposition of Total Job Destruction
80
Figure 2.16: Cleansing Effect and Outsourcers’ Layoffs as a share of Total Job Destruction
Figure 2.17: Job Creation by Outsourcers under Pattern A
81
References
Amiti, Mary, and Shang-Jin Wei, “Fear of Service Outsourcing: Is It Justified?,”
Economic Policy, 2005, pp.308-347
Amiti, Mary, and Shang-Jin Wei, “Service Offshoring, Productivity, and Employ-
ment: Evidence from the U.S.,” CEPR Discussion Papers DP5475, 2006
Anderson, James E., and Eric van Wincoop, “Trade Costs,” Journal of Economic
Literatrue, September 2004, pp.691-751
Bernard, Andrew B., J.Bradford Jensen, and Peter K. Schott, “Survival of the best
fit: Exposure to Low-Wage Countries and the (Uneven) Growth of U.S. Manufactur-
ing Plants,” Journal of International Economics vol.68, 2006, pp.219-237
Bernard, Andrew B., J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding, Peter K. Schott, “Firms
in International Trade,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2007, pp.105-130
Borga, Maria, “Trends in Employment at U.S. Multinational Companies: Evidence
from Firm-level Data,” Bureau of Economic Analysis mimeo, September 2005
Braconier, Henrik, Karolina Ekholm, “Swedish Multinationals and Competition from
High- and Low-Wage Locations,” Review of International Economics, 2000, pp. 448-
461
Brainard, S.Lael, David A. Riker, “Are U.S. Multinationals Exporting U.S. Jobs?”
NBER Working Paper Series No. 5958, 1997
Broda, Christian and David E. Weinstein, “Globalization and the Gains from Vari-
ety,” NBER Working Paper Series No.10314, February 2004
Caballero, Ricardo J., and Mohamad L. Hammour, “The Cleansing Effect of Reces-
sions,” The American Economic Review, Vol.84, No.5, 1994, pp.1350-1368
Crino, Rosario,“Offshoring, Multinationals, and Labor Market: A Review of the Em-
pirical Literature,” CESPRI working paper, 2007
Desai, Mihir A., C.Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr., “Foreign Direct Investment
and Domestic Economic Activity,” NBER working paper series No.11717, October
2005
Feenstra, Robert C., and Gordon H. Hanson, “Foreign Investment, Outsourcing, and
Relative Wages,” Political economy of trade policy: Essays in honor of Jagdish Bhag-
wati, Robert C. Feenstra, Geen M. Grossman, and Doublas A. Irwin, eds., MIT press,
1996 pp.89-127
82
Feenstra, Robert C., Gordon H. Hanson, and Deborah Swenson, “Offshore Assembly
from the United States: Production Characteristics of the 9802 Program,” in Robert
C. Feenstra, ed., Impact of International Trade and Wage, University of Chicago
Press, 2000, pp. 85-122
Ghironi, Fabio and Marc J. Melitz, “International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynam-
ics with Heterogeneous Firms,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2005,
pp.865-915
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman,“Outsourcing versus FDI in Industry
Equilibriu,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 2003, pp.317-327
Hanson, Gordon, Raymond Mataloni, and Matthew Slaughter, “Expansion Abroad
and the Domestic Operations of U.S. Multinational Firms,” Working Paper, 2003
Harrison, Ann E, and Margaret S. McMillan,“Dispelling Some Myths about Off-
shoring,” mimeo, 2006
Helpman, Elhanan, Marc J. Melitz, and Stephen R. Yeaple, “Export versus FDI with
Heterogeneous Firms,” The American Economic Review, March 2004, pp.300-316
Koller, Wolfgang, and Robert Stehrer,“Outsourcing and Employment: A Decompo-
sition Approach,” FIW Research Report No.018, 2008
Kurz, Christopher Johann, “Outstanding Outsourcers: A Firm- and Plant-level Anal-
ysis of Production Sharing,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Re-
serve Board, Washington, D.C., 2006
Mankiw, N. Gregory, Phillip Swagel, “The Politics and Economics of Offshore Out-
sourcing,” Journal of Monetary Economics, July 2006, pp.1027-1056
Melitz, Marc J., “The Impact of Trade onIntra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate
Industry Productivity,” Econometrica, 2003, pp1695-1725
Morissette, Rene, and Anick Johnson, “Offshoring and Employment in Canada: Some
Basic Facts,” Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series, Statistics Canada,
2007
Muendler, Marc-Andreas and Sascha O. Becker, “Margins of Multinational Labor
Substitution,” UCSD Working Paper, 2006
83
Chapter III
Offshore Outsourcing and Employment in the
US Manufacturing Sector
1 Introduction
In the year 2004, the one word that we heard on TV over and over, nearly as frequently
as terrorism and national security, was “offshore outsourcing.” The United States
was experiencing a jobless recovery from one of the most severe recessions in recent
history and offshoring was blamed for slow job creation. An Associated Press-Ipsos
poll in May 2004 showed that 69% of Americans thought offshoring hurt the US
economy, while only 17% thought it helped.20
The technical definition of offshore outsourcing is the delegation of non-core oper-
ations or jobs from internal production to an external firm that is located in a foreign
country through arm’s-length contract or a usage of an own foreign subsidiary. Tech-
nological development enabled fragmentation, and physical separation of the various
phases of a production process, and a reduction of trade restrictions enabled firms
to benefit from offshore outsourcing. Despite the cost efficiency that offshore out-
sourcing brings to firms, not everybody welcomes this growing phenomenon because
sending part of production process abroad is directly associated with layoffs of the
workers who were previously contributing to the processes that are being sent abroad.
20http://www.pollingreport.com/trade.htm
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The rise of offshore outsourcing is well investigated using input-output tables of
several nations by Hummels et al. (2001). They find, in ten OECD countries21 and
four emerging markets, 22 that off-shoring increased 30% between 1970 and 1990 and
accounted for 30% of the growth in these countries’ exports. Yeats (1998) finds sig-
nificance of this trend in international trade. In 1995, shipments of components from
developing countries (Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico) to OECD coun-
tries exceeded $100 billion, which demonstrates the interdependence of economies in
terms of manufacturing input supply. He also shows that this international input
trade is concentrated in a relatively few product groups - transport and machinery
products, textiles and clothing, leather goods, footwear and other labor-intensive
manufactures - as predicted by the theory of comparative advantage. Recent trends
include offshoring of service jobs such as telemarketers, IT engineers, bank loan pro-
cessors, insurance claims adjusters and even legal assistants. Forrester Research Inc.
released, in 2004, its estimate that the number of US service jobs moving offshore
by the end of 2005 would be 830,000. This is an updated estimate from 588,000, its
2002 estimate. It also suggests that 3.3 million service jobs will have gone overseas by
2015. However, the employment loss in manufacturing is far larger than this estimate.
Computer and electronic product manufacturing alone lost 433,198 jobs between 2001
and 2004.
There is substantial amount of empirical literature on the employment effects of
international trade (Kletzer (2002)); the empirical evidence on the impact of offshore
outsourcing remain insufficient. The most significant reason for this is limited data
availability. Unlike exports and imports, there is no data specifically collected on
offshoring activities. For this reason, many studies utilize firm-level data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on the foreign direct investment position of U.S.
firms. The results of these studies on employment effects are mixed. Brainard and
21US, UK, france, Italy, Japan, Canada, Germany, Australia, Denmark, and the Netherlands
22Ireland, Korea, Taiwan, and Mexico’s maquiladoras
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Riker (2001) find weak employment substitution effects between parents and affiliates
while Slaughter (2003) finds complementary effects. Harrison and McMillan (2007)
address the controversy by examining endogeneity, sample selection, and method-
ological issues. They find substitution effects for affiliates in low wage countries and
complementarity for those in high wage countries.
Although the BEA’s dataset provides very detailed information on the operations
of MNCs, the dataset does not contain any information on arm’s length contracts with
foreign suppliers, a widely used means of outsourcing. The 1987 and 1992 Census
of Manufactures (CMF) and Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) provide data on
the purchase of inputs from foreign sources. A number of studies utilize these data
to analyze the impact of outsourcing.
Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) investigate the shift in labor demand dur-
ing the1980s and find the demand shift to be largely correlated with skill-biased
technological change. They also find that outsourcing (measured by the share of
materials purchased from foreign sources) explains only a marginal portion of this
shift. Using an improved measure of outsourcing, Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) find
that, during the same period, 15-33% of wage inequality increases are explained by
outsourcing. In a later study, Feenstra and Hanson (1996b) analyze the impact of
outsourcing on the relative wages of both non-production and production workers.
Finding a positive connection between outsourcing and non-production worker’s real
wage, the researchers did not identify a similar correlation for production workers.
While most studies aggregate the data to 4-digit SIC industries, Kurz (2006) is the
first establishment- and firm-level outsourcing study utilizing the Census datasets.
Investigating the characteristics of outsourcers and outsourcing’s effect on plant-level
productivity growth, Kurz finds outsourcing firms to be larger, more skill-intensive,
and more productive. He also finds that outsourcing firms exhibit significantly higher
productivity growth. Unfortunately, after 1992, the CMF and ASM questionnaires
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no longer include the purchase of inputs from foreign sources so comparable analysis
for more recent years is not feasible.
These employment losses in both services and manufacturing sectors are the main
detriment of international trade and offshore outsourcing. While most economists
agree on net welfare gain from freer trade through an increase in overall economic
efficiency and aggregate income, we also admit that there are losers as well as win-
ners. The biggest losers in this game are the workers who are laid-off due to offshore
relocation of production facilities and reduction in production because of import com-
petition.
The public generally makes two mistakes. First, they tend to focus on the negative
side of the story. In case of outsourcing, there are two forces working against each
other; a negative one and a positive one. The negative one is the job loss from
the segment sent off to foreign countries. The positive one is the competitiveness
gain such as a rise in the sales due to lower prices. Offshoring is often viewed as
unpatriotic acts of greedy businesses. This implies that even the critics of offshoring
admit that offshoring is beneficial to most firms’ performance. However, they only
see the connection between employment and the physical relocation of tasks, not that
between employment and the performance enhancement.
Second, the public disregard the discussion of the counterfactual which is not
observable. In the absense of offshoring, US firms keep all jobs at home, but this is
not the end of the story. It does not prevent foreign competitors from outsourcing
and lowering costs and prices. Overtime, the price differential between US goods and
the rival goods will increases, US goods lose their competitiveness, lose their share
in the world market. US firms will have to decreases their production, which will
eventually reduce employment. This means prohibiting outsourcing saves domestic
employment only temporarily, but not permanently. My prediction for outsourcing is
that the sign of the total effect on post-outsourcing employment is ambiguous. Some
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outsourcing events destroy more jobs than they create; the others create more than
they destroy. Knowing that, one-size-fits-all type of policy can undesirably prohibit
job generating ones. The overall impact on employment is determined systematically
rather than arbitrarily. Knowledge about the mechanism behind the employment
outcome enables us to make more customized policy that improves US labor market.
In this study, I establish a structural model with two countries - the north and
the south, two sectors, and one factor of production - labor. The wage rate in the
south is lower than the northern wage rate, and the relative wage rate is fixed by
agricultural sector with homogenous products. Outsourcing occurs in the manufac-
turing sector where goods are differentiated. Manufacturing process consists of two
segments, assembly and services. As technology advances, physical separation of two
segments become possible, providing firms opportunities to take advantage of the
cross-country differences in wage rates and technology. In the numerical analysis,
I find that outsourcing raises the share of the market served by northern varieties
tremendously. For benchmark parameters, there is gain of 48% of the world market
from outsourcing. Employment effect is also generally positive, implying that the job
creation from the benefits of outsourcing is larger than the job destruction directly
caused by the physical relocation of part of the business processes.
In section II, the theoretical model is introduced. Section III derives the free trade
equilibrium and the outsourcing equilibrium. Section IV present the theoretical and
numerical results, Section V concludes.
2 Model
There are two countries, the north and the south. Southern variables are marked
with an asterisk. These countries only differ in that southern workers are less pro-
ductive than northern workers. Labor endowment is the same in two countries as
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L. Consumer preferences are also identical across countries. There are two sectors,
agriculture and manufacturing, and both sectors are tradable and only use labor as
a factor of production. Agricultural products are homogeneous, so they are traded
under one world price. This world agricultural price determines the wage rates in two
countries as long as both countries produce positive amount of output in agricultural
sector.
Manufacturing products are differentiated and produced through two processes,
assembly and services; and each segment hires a fixed number of workers. The as-
sembly segment is technologically identical across countries, but the northern service
segment is technologically superior; that is, the service labor requirement is smaller
for a northern firm than for a southern firm. As technology advances, fragmentation -
physical separation of assembly and services - becomes feasible. Manufacturing firms
outsource one or both segments abroad if it is profitable.
2.1 Demand
Northern and Southern consumers have identical preferences that are represented by
a two-tier utility function. The upper tier utility function is of a Cobb-Douglas form
where uA and uM are subutilities from consumption of agricultural and manufacturing
products, respectively.





uA is the utility from consuming agricultural products, and is linear in the quantity
of consumption. uM is the utility from consuming manufacturing products, and it
takes the form of CES utility function.









N is the number of varieties, and the elasticity of substitution is ε = 1/(1− ρ). The





E is the total expenditures on manufcaturing varieties in the north and is (1− z)wL.










There are two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing, in both countries. Labor is the
only factor of production, so technology is represented as unit labor requirement.
2.2.1 Agriculture
Agricultural products are produced both in both countries and are tradable. In each
country, the size of agricultural sector is sufficiently large, so neither country com-
pletely specializes in manufacturing. Since agricultural sector is perfectly competitive,
each country’s wage rate is determined by the world agricultural price. One unit of
agricultural product is produced by one unit of labor in the north. Southern workers
are less productive, so one worker produces only ? unit of output. Workers are paid
their marginal product. Therefore, no matter which country is the exporter of agri-
cultural products, the ratio of labor productivity determines the wage rates in two
countries, and the relative wage rate is the same as the relative labor productivity.
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That is,
w∗ = δw where δ < 1 (16)
Since the northern and southern labor endowment is equal, δ again determines the
relative size of the southern economy. Southern GDP, which is δwL is lower than
northern GDP, which is wL. δ also implies the relative manufacturing expenditure.
E∗ = δE (17)
2.2.2 Manufacturing: under Free Trade without Outsourcing
Each firm in the manufacturing sector produces a unique variety. Production of each
unit is composed of two separate segments, assembly and services, and each segment
hires a fixed number of workers, lA0 and l
S
0 respectively. The labor requirement for












There is no technology differential in the assembly segment (lA0 = l
A∗0), but
northern service technology is superior to the southern one, so the service labor
requirement is smaller in the north. Let γ and γ∗ denote the size of service segment












Let R be the ratio of unit labor requirement between a southern and a northern
manufacturing firm, and RS be the ratio of labor requirement in the service segment




0 . R and RS measure the size
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of inefficiency of the overall southern manufacturing sector and the southern service
segment, respectively, compared to the northern counterparts. Both are greater than










There is a fixed overhead production cost, f . f is measured in labor unit and same
for both northern and southern firms. Where Q is the quantity of output, the total
labor requirement for a northern firm is, therefore, Ql0+f . It is Ql
∗
0 +f for a southern
firm.
2.2.3 Manufacturing: under Free Trade with Offshoring
Later, technological advancement allows fragmentation of business processes; so, as-
sembly segment and service segment become physically separable. Offshoring one or
more segments is an option to both northern and southern firms. Offshoring provides
firms an opportunity to take advantage of cross-country differences in wage rates and
technology. When one segment is outsourced to the other country, the labor require-
ment for the segment in the host country is relevant for the production. That is, if
a northern firm outsources its assembly segment to the south, the firm needs to hire
lA
∗
0 southern workers for assembly and l
S
0 northern workers for services.
However, offshoring causes inefficiency such as coordination difficulties caused by
physical distance, language barrier, cultural difference, etc. This inefficiency can
be resolved by putting more resources. Therefore, offshoring firms hire additional
workers, ϕ − 1 workers per production worker. If a firm outsources only part of its
entire process, the outsourcing cost only applies to the segment that is sent abroad.
For the northern firms that outsources the assembly segment to the south, the unit






After fragmentation becomes feasible, a firm, either southern or northern, has
four operating options; first, to perform both segment at home as before; second,
to outsource only the assembly segment from a foreign country; third, to outsource
only the service segment from a foreign country; last, to outsource both segments
from a foreign country. Since two segments are perfectly separable, cost for each
segment is also independent. Therefore, outsourcing decision can be made for each
segment separately. A firm compares the costs for outsourcing and home operation,
and chooses what costs less.
Consider a northern firm that decides whether to outsource either segment or
both. First, the firm compares the cost of keeping the assembly segment at home and
outsourcing it to the south. The relevant labor costs for the assembly segment are
i) Offshore Outsourcing: w∗ϕlP
∗
0 = δϕ(1− γ)wl0 (21)
ii) Home Operation: wlP0 = (1− γ)wl0





This is where the relative southern wage rate is low enough to offset the cost of dealing
with the additional inefficiency.
Then, the northern firm shifts its attention to the labor costs of service segment.
That is,









ii) Home Operation: wlS0 = γwl0
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This is where the southern wage is low enough to offset the inferior technology and
the additional outsourcing inefficiency.
Southern firms make their offshoring decision in exactly the same manner. A
southern sends its assembly segment to the north if and only if
δ > ϕ (25)
This inequality can not hold since δ < 1 and ϕ > 1. Therefore, southern firms
never outsource their assembly segment to the north. This is because there is no
technology advantage in the northern assembly segment, but the wage is higher and
also there is extra inefficiency to take care of in case of outsourcing. Then, offshoring





A firm can reduce the cost by utilizing the superior northern technology despite of
higher wage and additional inefficiency. This is possible where the southern wage rate
is not low enough relative to northern one.
Equations (22), (24), and (26) determine the pattern of outsourcing of the man-
ufacturing firms in the north and the south. The pattern is summarized in figure 1.
Different industries with different partner countries choose different pattern of out-
sourcing depending on the sizes of the technology and wage differentials.
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3 Equilibrium
The importance of agricultural sector is in fixing the relative wage rate. Since the
goal of this analysis is in finding the employment effect of offshore outsourcing which
is only feasible in manufacturing sector, I only discuss variables in that sector. First,
I characterize the equilibrium before offshore outsourcing is feasible, second, the out-
sourcing equilibrium. The comparison will follow.
3.1 Free Trade Equilibrium: Equilibrium without Outsourcing
In the initial free trade equilibrium, firms perform both assembly and services segment
at home utilizing the local workers. The northern and southern wage rates are fixed
by the world price of agricultural products as w and w
∗
= δw respectively. The
marginal cost of a manufacturing product is the wage rate multiplied by the unit
labor requirement; that is,







Each firm produces a unique variety, so all firms are monopolists. Each firm
charges its monopoly price, a constant markup over the marginal cost. The markup
is common for all firms, both southern and southern. The prices of northern and


















From equations (16) and (18), the price differential can be expressed as the wage
differential adjusted for the technology differential.
P
∗
0 = δRP0 (29)
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There is iceberg transport cost. In order for one unit of goods to be sold in the
foreign market, τ unit must be shipped. That is, the transport cost is equivalent to ad
valorem tariff of τ − 1. Prices in the foreign market will be adjusted for the transport
cost; therefore, the relative prices between the northern and southern products in two
markets are different. One unit of northern and southern products is sold for P0 and
τP
∗
0 , respectively, in the northern market, and τP0 and P
∗
0 in the southern market.
The relative price in each market determines the relative demand for northern and
southern varieties according to equation (14).
Let n0 and n
∗
0 denote the number or northern and southern varieties, respectively.
The asymmetry in labor productivity across countries results in different numbers of
northern and southern varieties. From equations (15) and (29), the manufacturing












τ 1−ε + N0(δR)
1−ε]n0P 1−ε0 } 11−ε (31)
N0 is the ratio of the number of southern firms and the number of northern firms in
free trade equilibrium, that is N0 = n
∗
0/n0.
The demand function, equation (14), with price indices, equations (30) and (31),
yields the quantity demanded for each variety. The quantity required to serve the
foreign market includes the transport cost. The total quantity each northern firm

































τ 1−ε + N0(δR)1−ε
]
(33)
The manufacturing sector is free to enter, so all firms’ profits will be driven down
to zero in the equilibrium. Firms will produce their zero profit quantities, Q0 for a
northern firm and Q
∗










Equations (32), (33), and (34) characterize the goods market clearing conditions in






δ(1 + δτ 2−2ε)− (1 + δ)(τδR)1−ε









δ(1 + δτ 2−2ε)− (1 + δ)(τδR)1 − ε
[δ − (τδR)1−ε] [(δR)1−ε − δτ 1−ε]
}
(36)
In equilibrium, northern and southern varieties can co-exist because the manu-
facturing products are differentiated, and there is demand for high price northern
varieties as well as low price southern varieties. However, where the price differential
is too large, the demand for northern varieties may not be large enough to generate
revenue enough to cover the fixed production cost. Therefore, in an extreme case, the
world market for manufacturing products could be taken over by varieties from one
country. Where the northern price is too high compared to the southern one, which
requires very small δR, all northern firms will exit. This is the case where the number
of northern varieties, equation (35), becomes zero. Likewise, all southern firms will
exit if southern price is too high compared to the northern one, which requires a very
large value of δR. This is the case where the number of southern varieties, equation
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(36), becomes zero. Instead of analyzing these two cases based on the value of δR, I
focus on the value of δ.
δ0 and δ0 denote the value of the wage differential where n0 ad n
∗
0 become zero,
respectively. In equilibrium, given R, we will only see northern varieties if δ is lower
than δ0, only southern varieties if δ is higher than δ0, and both varieties if δ is between
the two threshold values. δ0 and δ0 satisfy the following conditions which is obtained









2−2ε)− (1 + δ0) (τδ0R)1−ε = 0
Finally, the free trade equilibrium in the absence of offshore outsourcing is charac-
terized by the two threshold values of δ, δ0 and δ0, and the numbers of northern and
southern varieties, n0 and n
∗
0.
(EqmFT .A) n0 = 0 and n
∗
0 =
(1 + δ)(1− z)L
δεf
if δ ≤ δ0
(38)






(δR)1−ε(δ + τ 2−2ε)− τ 1−εδ(1 + δ)
(δR)1−ε [δ(1 + δτ 2−2ε)− (1 + δ)(τδR)1−ε]
if δ ∈ (δ0, δ0)
(39)
(EqmFT .C) n0 =




0 = 0 if δ ≥ δ0
(40)
3.1.1 Free Trade Equilibrium A : South only Equilibrium
In this equilibrium, only southern firms serve the world manufacturing market and
the north specializes in agricultural production. Thus, the employment in each sector
98
in the north is
LM0 = 0 and L
A
0 = L (41)
In the south, there are n
∗
0 manufacturing firms, equation (38). amd eacj firm produces
Q
∗











(1 + δ)(1− z)L
δ
(42)
3.1.2 Free Trade Equilibrium B: Co-Existence Equilibrium
In this equilibrium, both northern and southern firms co-exist in the manufacturing
market. Each firm produces its zero profit quantity, Q0 and Q
∗
0, equation (34). Since
every firm produces its fixed zero profit quantity which only depends on the marginal
cost and the elasticity of substitution, the numbers of northern and southern firms
are crucial in determining the share of world market the North or the South serves
and the level of employment in manufacturing sector in each country. The numbers
of varieties is summarized by the ratio, N0, in the co-existence range, equilibrium B,
equation (??). The ratio is decreasing in δ and R. That is, as δR rises, southern
varieties lose the price advantage, so the market is less favorable for them. Since each
firm’s supply is fixed by the zero profit quantity, equation (34), it reduces the ratio,
N0, so that there are relatively more northern varieties than southern ones in the
market.






δ(1 + τ 2−2ε)− (1 + δ)(τδR)1−ε





0 = (1− z)L
{
(δR)1−ε(δ + τ 2−2ε)− τ 1−εδ(1 + δ)
[δ − (τδR)1−ε] [(δR)1−ε − δτ 1−ε]
}
(44)
The northern varieties together get the revenue of n0P0Q0 while southern varieties






0. This with equations (29), (34), (35), (36), and (39)





As N0 is decreasing in δ, the market share of northern varieties is also decreasing in δ.
Again, larger δ means smaller price advantage of southern varieties, so larger portion
of the world manufacturing market is served by northern varieties.
3.1.3 Free Trade Equilibrium C : North Only Equilibrium
There are n0 northern firms, equation (40), in the market and each produces its zero
profit quantity, Q0, equation (34). Therefore, the total employment in the manufac-
turing sector in the north is
LM0 = (1 + δ)(1− z)L (46)
Figure 2 summarizes the northern manufacturing employment for different value of
δ, equations (41), (43), and (46).
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3.2 Outsourcing Equilibrium
Once fragmentation becomes feasible, firms make outsourcing decisions according
to their decision criteria, equations (22), (24), (26). As shown in figure 1, various
patterns of outsourcing are possible depending on the parameter values. In this
section, I only discuss the most plausible case where northern firms outsource their
assembly segment to the south while the southern firms do not outsource. This is the
case where δ satisfies the following inequality.
1
ϕRS
≤ δ < ϕ
RS
(47)
The variables under the outsourcing equilibrium are presented with subscript 1.
Since northern firms outsource its assembly segment, the relevant marginal cost
comes from the first equation in equations (21) and the second equation in equations
(23). So, the marginal cost for a northern firm is
MC1 = [ δϕ(1− γ) + γ ] wl0 (48)
I define λ as follows.
λ = δϕ(1− γ) + γ (49)
Using equation (49), I can rewrite the marginal cost of a northern variety in out-
sourcing equilibrium as MC1 = λMC0. λ is the relative marginal cost of a northern
variety in the outsourcing equilibrium compared to the initial free trade equilibrium.
In other words, the cost saving from outsourcing is 1 − λ. Southern varieties are
produced in the south as in the initial free trade equilibrium; therefore, the marginal
cost does not change. The prices of northern and southern varieties are a constant
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Unfinished products from the assembly segments are to be processed through the
service segment in order to be ready for sale. In case two segments are located
in different countries, the products must be shipped to the location of the service
segment. I assume that there is no additional transport cost in this process. One can
understand this as that the additional outsourcing inefficiency cost (ϕ−1) includes the
cost of transporting the assembled products to the service location. Then, products
will be ready for sale, and shipped to the other country for exporting. This shipment
will require the transport cost of τ − 1.
The manufacturing price indices are obtained in the same manner as those of the





































The quantity demanded for each variety, including the additional unit for trans-
















)1−ε + δτ 1−ε













































Goods market clearing conditions are characterized by equations (54), (55), and (56).





































)1−ε − δτ 1−ε]
 (58)
As in the initial free trade equilibrium, the world market could be dominated by
the varieties from only one country in extreme cases. We will be in the South Only
equilibrium where n1 becomes zero, and in the North Only equilibrium where n
∗
1
becomes zero. Where both n1 and n
∗
1 are positive, we will be in the Co-Existence
equilibrium. These three equilibria are, again, separated by two threshold values of
δ, δ1 and δ1. That is, there will be only southern varieties in the market if δ is
smaller than δ1, only northern varieties if δ is larger than δ1, and both varieties if δ
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2−2ε)− (1 + δ1)(τ δ1Rλ
)1−ε
= 0
The outsourcing equilibrium is characterized by the numbers of northern and southern
varieties and two threshold values of δ.
(EqmOS.A) n1 = 0 and n
∗
1 =
(1 + δ)(1− z)L
δεf




















)1−ε] if δ ∈ (δ1, δ1)
(61)
(EqmOS.C) n1 =




1 = 0 if δ ≥ δ1
(62)
3.2.1 Outsourcing Equilibrium A : South Only Equilibrium
In this equilibrium, only southern firms serve the manufacturing market and the north
specializes in agricultural production. Since behavior of southern firms is not altered
by the feasibility of fragmentation, this equilibrium is identical to the South Only
Free Trade equilibrium (EqmFT .A). Therefore, the manufacturing employment in
two countries are















1 · εf =




3.2.2 Outsourcing Equilibrium B: Co-Existence Equilibrium
Northern and southern varieties co-exist in the market. The northern share of the
market depends on the relative prices, λ/δR - equation (51). Again, each firm pro-
duces a fixed amount of output, hence hires a fixed number of workers. The ratio of
numbers of southern and northern varieties, N1, is crucial in determining the market
share and the total employment of the northern firms. Larger δ and larger R im-
plies smaller price advantage of southern varieties, and smaller λ implies larger cost
reduction from outsourcing. These work in favor of northern varieties, lowering the
ratio N1. Therefore, N1 is decreasing in δ and R, and increasing in λ. The northern
share of the market directly depends on the ratio of numbers of varieties, so it is also





However, employment in outsourcing equilibrium does not only depend on N1 because
γ, the size of service segment, determines the size of layoff due to the outsourcing and
also affects the relative marginal cost, λ. Larger γ means smaller assembly segment
which is translated to smaller layoffs, but it also means smaller cost reduction which
reduces the benefits to the northern firms, so smaller sale increase and, hence, smaller
job creation. The total manufacturing employment is still increasing in δ and R.
The total employment in manufacturing in the north and the south can be written
as the following.
LM1 = (1− z)L
[



































δ + τ 2−2ε
)
(67)








1 + δτ 2−2ε
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3.2.3 Outsourcing Equilibrium C : North Only Equilibrium
There are only northern firms in manufacturing sector and the south specializes in
agricultural sector. In the outsourcing equilibrium, the northern firms hire southern
workers in their assembly segment, so the southern manufacturing employment is pos-
itive even though there is no southern varieties in the market. The total employment
in the northern and southern manufacturing sector is
LM1 = (1 + δ)(1− z)L









Figure 3 summarizes the northern manufacturing employment for different value of
δ, equations (63), (66), and (68).
4 Results
Each equilibrium consists of three different ranges of δ, South-only, Co-Existence and
North-only range. The thresholds between the ranges are determined by equations
(37) and (59). Outsourcing changes the threshold values, and it is summarized in
proposition 1 and 2.
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Proposition 6 The threshold values of wage ddifferential that separates South
Only equilibrium and Co-Existence equilibrium decreases with outsourcing.
That is,
δ1 < δ0
Proposition 7 The threshold values of wage differential that separates Co-
Existence equilibrium and North Only equilibrium decreases with outsourcing.
That is,
δ1 < δ0
The panel (a) of Figure (4) shows the market compositions before and after outsourc-
ing. As the thresholds decrease with outsourcing, northern firms survive in wider
range of δ given the size of technology differential, R. They survive in the range
δ ∈ (δ0, 1] in the absence of outsourcing, but in the δ ∈ (δ1, 1] in the outsourcing
equilibrium. There is a gain of a range δ ∈ (δ0, δ1].
The threshold values of δ are dominated by three parameters; transport cost (τ),
the size of the technological advantage in the North (R), and the size of the service
segment (γ). High transport cost expands the width of the Co-Existence range; and,
large northern technological advantage, R, moves the Co-existence range down along
the spectrum of δ. The small service segment, γ, enlarges the size of the threshold
decrease between the equilibria; in other words, the changes summarized in proposi-
tion 1 and 2 get larger where service segment is a smaller fraction of manufacturing
process.
Panel (b) depicts the size of the northern manufacturing employment in two equi-
libria. Both have increasing trend as shown in Figure 2 and 3, but the positions of the
kinks differ as threshold values of δ decrease as shown in panel (a). Panel (c) shows
the net employment change after the outsourcing which is the employment in the
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outsourcing equilibrium net of the employment in the initial free trade equilibrium.
The employment response can be analyzed for five different regions as shown as
A to E in panel (a). In region A, where the southern wage rate is very low, the
market is occupied by the southern varieties, so the north specializes in agriculture.
The size of employment in the northern manufacturing sector is zero in both equi-
libria. In region B, the northern share of the world market increases from zero to
positive; therefore, the effect of outsourcing on the employment is positive. In region
C, northern and southern varieties compete against each other in both equilibria.
In outsourcing equilibrium, the Northern varieties gain competitiveness by lowering
their prices, resulting in a transfer of a fraction of the market from southern varieties
to northern ones. For low values of δ, the initial market share is very small, and so is
the size of the job destruction. The job creation exceeds the job destruction by a large
amount, so the net employment effect is positive and large. For higher values of δ,
the net employment change is relatively small due to the large size of job destruction.
In region D, the northern varieties were quite competitive initially, so the gain from
the price reduction is small, and so is the net employment change. In region E, there
are no southern varieties, so northern varieties compete against each other. The price
reduction from outsourcing takes market share from each other. There is still job
creation since prices fall where the total expenditure on manufacturing products is
fixed. The total quantity of consumption rises; so firms hire more workers in the ser-
vice segment. However, northern manufacturing sector loses the assembly segment,
generating large job destruction. Therefore, the net employment effect is negative.
4.1 Numerical Results
For the numerical analysis, I choose a set of parameter values. There are six pa-
rameters in the model; the ratio of the southern wage to the northern wage (δ), the
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elasticity of substitution (ε), size of the service segment (γ), transport cost (τ), in-
efficiency cost of outsourcing (ϕ), and the technological advantage of the northern
manufacturing sector (R). The benchmark value chosen for ε is 5. Broda and We-
instein (2006) estimate various elasticities for different aggregation level (3-, 4-, and
5-digit) of SITC manufacturing industry classifications (Rev.2 for 1972-1988, Rev.3
for 1990-2001). I use the estimates of 4-digit SITC for the period 1990-2001 whose
median value is 5.88. γ is 0.4 implying that the size of services account for 40% of
business process for a typical firm. 2002 Census of Manufactures shows that the share
of non-production workers in the total manufacturing payroll is 40%. The transport
cost is equivalent of 70% ad valorem tariff rate (τ = 1.7). This is estimated from
the trade flow data using gravity equation (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). The
inefficiency cost, ϕ, and the technological differential, R, are arbitrarily chosen as
ϕ = 1.15 and R = 3. These values imply outsourcing raises the production cost by
15% due to inefficiency, and northern manufacturing technology is three times more
efficient than the southern counterpart. The values R = 3 and γ = 0.4 implies that
Rs = 6; in other words, the northern service segment is six times more efficient than
the southern counterpart.
First, I present the impact of offshore outsourcing on the northern share of vari-
ous markets in figure 5. The range of δ is that of coexistence range. Since threshold
values δ and δ, fall with outsourcing, the range shown lies on the lower values of δ
for outsourcing equilibrium. For the δ above the range shown, the northern share of
the world market is 100%since there will only be northern varieties. Due to transport
costs, the imported goods have price disadvantages in both northern and southern
market. Therefore, the northern share of the northern market is higher than that
of the southern market. This is the case in the outsourcing equilibrium since the
transportation structure is preserved. The comparison between two panels should
be made not only on the shape of the curves, but also the value of δ. The wage
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differential does not change with outsourcing because the relative wage rate of one
country compared to the other is determined in the agricultural sector. Therefore,
the comparison should be made for the same value of delta. For instance, for δ = 0.3
- southern wage rate is 30% of the northern wage rate -, northern varieties serve 2% of
the southern market, 55% of the northern market, that is 42% of the world market in
the absence of outsourcing. When northern firms outsource their assembly segment,
and reduce their prices, they together serve 63% of the southern market, 98% of the
northern market, that is 90% of the world manufacturing market. Outsourcing com-
pletely changes the composition of the market, in favor of those who take advantage
of outsourcing.
Figure 6 shows the panel (b) and (c) of figure 4 for the benchmark parameter
values. In panel (a), we can see that the threshold values decrease with outsourcing.
Panel (b) shows the net employment effect. Since the equilibrium is calculated under
the case where the northern firms outsource their assembly segments, and the southern
firms outsource neither segment, I present the net employment change only for the
relevant range of the wage differential, equation (36). That is δ ∈ [0.1449, 0.1917) for
the benchmark case. In the relevant range of ?, the net employment effect is positive.
That is the benefit from outsourcing generates job creation that is larger than the
job destruction from sending the assembly jobs to the south.
This result could be driven by the parameter values chosen for the benchmark case.
I replicate figure 6 for different parameter values in figure 7. The left column shows
the level of northern manufacturing employment in two equilibria. In all six cases,
we can see that the threshold values fall with outsourcing, generating job creation
from moving south-only equilibrium to co-existence equilibrium. We can also see that
in North only equilibrium, employment falls with outsourcing. This is because the
competition is among northern firms even in the free trade equilibrium, so the gain
from outsourcing for the northern manufacturing sector as a whole is not large enough
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to offset the job destruction from physical relocation of assembly segment. In most
cases, the net employment effect is positive. In two cases - the one with low elasticity
of substitution and the other with large assembly segment -, the relevant range of δ
fall in the south only equilibrium, leaving northern manufacturing sector with zero
employment.
5 Conclusion
As technology advances, physical separation of different manufacturing stages be-
comes possible. Firms take advantage of the cost reducing opportunity, and send
part of their businesses to foreign countries where wage rates are lower. The theo-
retical model presented in this study has two countries where manufacturing firms
within each country share the same production technology to produce differentiated
products. The wage rate is lower in the south, but the northern service segment
is technologically superior. Northern firms could outsource either assembly or ser-
vice segment, or both to the south depending on the parameter values, but southern
firms will only consider outsourcing the service segment. As firms explore the profit
improving options, both job destruction and creation occur. Job destruction comes
from the physical relocation of one or more segments, and job creation comes from
the realized benefit of outsourcing - sales increase.
In the analysis of the case where northern firms outsource their assembly segments
to the south while southern firms outsource neither segment, there is significant in-
crease in northern share of the market. As prices of northern varieties fall, the decrease
in relative price of northern varieties generate large consumption shift from the south-
ern varieties to the northern varieties. For the benchmark parameters considered in
the numerical analysis shows 61 percentage point increase in the northern share of
the southern market, 43 percentage point increase in the northern market; together
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35 percent of the world market shifts from southern varieties to northern ones.
Outsourcing widens the range of wage differential over which northern firms can
compete in the world market. In other words, in the absence of outsourcing, the
relative price of northern varieties is so high that there is no market for northern
varieties. The price reduction that outsourcing brings to the northern varieties enables
the northern firms to compete in the market. In the process, there is large gain in the
northern share of the market, which in turn generates large job creation. Employment
analysis shows that such job creation is larger than the job destruction from the
assembly segment that is sent to the south, yielding net employment gain for various
sets of parameter values investigated.
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Figure 3.1: Pattern of Offshore Outsourcing
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Figure 3.2: Size of Northern Manufacturing Employment in the Free Trade Equilibrium
Figure 3.3: Size of Northern Manufacturing Employment in the Outsourcing Equilibrium
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of Equilibria
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Figure 3.5: Northern Share of Various Markets
Figure 3.6: Employment Effect on the Benchmark Case
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Figure 3.7: Net Employment Effects with Various Sets of Parameter Values (1)
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Figure 3.7: Net Employment Effects with Various Sets of Parameter Values (2)
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Chapter IV
Does Occupational Training by the Trade Adjustment
Assistance Program Really Help Reemployment?
Success Measured as Matching
1 Introduction
International trade has constantly increased throughout the second half of the 20th
century, and the trend will continue well into 21st century. International trade used to be
mostly in finished goods; however, continuous technological advancement and the resulting
reduction in transport cost expanded international trade to include inputs (Yeats [1998],
Hummels et al. [2001]). As virtually every good (and even services) becomes tradable,
international trade is more active than ever.
International trade has changed the competitive structure between developing and de-
veloped countries, and this affects the employment in both groups of countries. First, goods
from developed countries have to compete against cheaper goods from developing countries.
This is a more traditional type of competition. Since the goods from developed countries
lose their market shares to goods from developing countries due to their high relative prices,
employment in these countries decreases in the sectors that face high import competition
(see Kletzer, 2002). Second, workers from developed countries have to compete against low-
wage workers from developing countries. International trade and fragmentation together
provide great cost-reducing opportunities for firms. Firms utilize the practice of offshore
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outsourcing, either by establishing their own subsidiaries in low wage countries or by using
arm’s length contracts with foreign firms, to perform tasks that were previously performed
by high-wage domestic workers. The tasks that are being outsourced offshore are not only
production-related, but also services (Amiti and Wei, 2005). This has both positive and neg-
ative effects on employment in the developed countries. Employment may rise as efficiency
of outsourcing firms increases, their prices fall and market shares rise. Firms maintain some
parts of their business process at home, and increases in sales will expand employment in
the domestic part of their business as well as the foreign part. If sales gain is substantial,
it is possible that employment in the domestic portion of those firms actually rises above
the level prior to outsourcing. However, the workers whose tasks are replaced by activities
of workers in developing countries lose their jobs.
While most economists agree on there being a net welfare gain from freer trade through
an increase in overall economic efficiency and aggregate income, larger variety of consumer
products, and lower prices, they do not deny the fact that there are winners and losers.
The biggest losers from international trade are the workers displaced due to the increase
in competition from imports and offshoring. The Trade Adjustment Assistance program
(TAA) is specifically designed to compensate these workers.
Many studies find that TAA participants are, compared to a broader group of displaced
workers such as Unemployment Insurance (UI) beneficiaries, more likely to have a harder
time finding a job. Baicker and Rehavi (2004) show that TAA participants are older, less
educated, and include a higher fraction of people without an adequate level of English
proficiency. Corson and Decker (1995) show that the majority (72% compared to 31% for
UI exhaustees) are displaced due to plant/company closures; therefore they are less likely
to be recalled by their previous employers.23 Their tenure with previous employers is also
higher than UI exhaustees. These facts indicate that TAA participants may benefit from
moving to different occupations, and that they are not very likely to have employable skills.
This suggests the need for provision of vocational training services. For this reason, training
2323% of TAA participants reported that recall is likely while 43% of UI exhaustees reported so.
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and income support during training are the most important benefits of the TAA program.
Other benefits are summarized in Table 1.
The performance of the TAA program is officially assessed by three performance mea-
sures: Average Earnings (or Wage Replacement Rate, up to 2006), Reemployment Rate,
and Retention Rate as of fiscal year 2008. Table 2 summarizes the performance of the
TAA program for fiscal years 2003-2007. These performance measures provide a general
idea of whether TAA participants find a job that replaces reasonably well the job prior to
participation. However, these performance measures do not directly measure the efficacy of
the training service in helping participants’ re-employment and post-exit economic welfare.
An article in The New Yorker by Katherine Boo (2004)24 tells a story about a woman
who was laid off from the Fruit of the Loom plant located in Harlingen, TX, at the end of
2003. She received medical-assistant training, applied for twenty-nine positions, got three
interviews, but ended up serving lunch at a nearby construction site. The article describes
the reality of the training program in Cameron County as follows:
In the past five years, more than a thousand displaced manufacturing workers had
been retrained as medical assistants or air-conditioning repairmen or computer-
maintenance technicians. . . . The state workforce commission had predicted
that twenty-five medical-assistant jobs would open in Cameron County in 2003,
but it would be difficult to secure one. In one class of laid-off textile workers alone,
eighty-five people had been trained for the profession.
This article suggests that many participants receive training in occupations in which there
are not enough job openings and end up in occupations unrelated to their training. There
are studies investigating whether trainees do better after program exit compared to non-
trainees in terms of the above three performance measures - see Corson and Decker (1995) for
the TAA program, and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) for federal training programs
in general. However, how much obtaining skills for a specific occupation through classroom
training contributed to their reemployment is still not well explored.
The information on TAA participants, services that they received, and the outcomes is
24“Letter from South Texas: The Churn,” The New Yorker, March 29th, 2004
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reported by Trade Act Participant Report (TAPR). TAPR reports the 8-digit Occupational
Skill Training Code (OSTC) and Occupational Code of Employment (OCE) for each partic-
ipant who received training service. From a preliminary investigation of TAA participants
who exited the program between July, 2004 and September, 2007, I find that only 45% of
people who received occupational skills training have identical codes for OSTC and OCE.25
This might indicate that for 55% of trainees, training was a waste of resources. This is an
inherent problem of federal training programs since the supply of trainees is only loosely
linked to the demand for newly trained workers. The mismatch between supply and de-
mand for trainees is not only a problem of the federal programs of the US. For the cases of
apprenticeship systems of Germany and Denmark, see Rasmussen and Westergaard-Nielsen
(1999). According to the US General Accounting Office (GAO), the cost of training - tu-
ition for training classes and additional TRA payments - accounted for 48.36% of TAA
expenditure for fiscal years 1995-1999.26 The supply and demand mismatch issue indicates
that there is ssignificant room to improve the cost efficiency and program performances of
training programs. For this reason, a good understanding of the mismatch problem is very
important.
In this project, I investigate the efficacy of the retraining service provided through the
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, focusing on the match between OSTC and
OCE reported in TAPR. More specifically, I investigate what the probability is of matching
between OSTC and OCE, and how matching is affected by the individual characteristics of
participants and the services that they received. I also look at whether matching improves
the participants’ post-participation economic welfare - measured by reemployment rates,
average earnings, wage replacement rates, and retention rates - by comparing the outcome
measures for trainees with a match, trainees without a match, and non-trainees.
First I investigate the hypothesis that matching is a result of successful training. I
25The total number of observations is 143,301. Only 30,538 of them have valid codes for both
OSTC and OCE. 45% matching is among those 30,538 trainees.
26Training and Additional TRA accounted for 29.95% and 18.41%, repectively, of the total ex-
penditure. Most of the rest of TAA expenditure was used to pay Basic TRA. Non-training-related
services - reemployment services, job search allowances, and relocation allowances - accounted for a
negligible fraction of the total expenditure.
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use educational attainment as a proxy for learning ability, which would help participants
succeed in their training. Education shows an insignificant or negative effect on matching,
however, unless the occupational choices of participants are controlled for. This might be
because more educated people receive training that is more generally applicable, such as
management, so a match is not a dominant factor in choice of employment for them. As the
highly educated tend to choose a non-match occupation for their employment - compared
to the less educated who has limited sets of skills that can only be applied to certain
occupations - the link between learning ability and matching becomes blurred.
Investigation of reemployment rates shows that occupational skills training and OJT
improve the chance of reemployment by 5 and 10 percentage points, respectively. Education
also helps. participants with Bachelor’s degree show 5 percentage points higher chance of
reemployment than those with less than a high school degree. The most important factor
for reemployment rate, though, is the age of the participant. Age shows an upside-down
U-shape relationship with the reemployment rate, indicating that workers between age 21
and 30 are most favored by employers. The impact of old age is extremely negative - 41%
lower chance of reemployment for workers between age 61 and 65 compared to workers
between age 41 and 50, but this can partially be explained by voluntary withdrawal from
the labor market.
Matching significantly affects both post-participation earnings and the wage replace-
ment rate. This effect is unaffected by different occupational choices by participants for
both outcome measures. The wage replacement rates for trainees with a match are 3 to
4 percentage points higher than those of non-trainees. However, education and age affect
earnings by substantially larger magnitudes than matching. The impact of higher-than-
Bachelor’s-degree is 10 times larger than the impact of having a match. Age again shows
an upside-down U-shape relationship with highest earnings for participants of age between
41 and 50. For wage replacement, the influence of education is of similar size to that of
a match. However, the negative impact of age increases monotonically with age. Workers
between age 16 and 21 have a 27 percentage point higher wage replacement rate than those
124
of age between 41 and 50. Workers of age between 61 and 65 have a 15-18% lower rate
compared to the 41-50 age group. Matching does not improve the retention rate. The
retention rate is affected by occupational skills training - by 1% - and OJT - by 3%. The
impact of education is positive, but smaller than 2%.
Although determining what aspect of training leads to a match needs further investiga-
tion, achieving a match is important in improving post-participation outcomes - especially
earnings-related measures - of participants. The results show that although outcome mea-
sures for trainees are generally better than non-trainees, occupational skills training alone
- training that does not lead to a match - does not improve the outcome measure. This
implies that the focus of the TAA program on provision of training services can only be
fruitful if it is accompanied by emphasis on choosing the right occupations for participants
by thorough career assessment and counseling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the TAA program in
more detail, section III introduces the data set and provides various descriptive statistics.
Section IV presents the analytical methodology and results. Section V concludes.
2 Trade Adjustment Assistance
The TAA program is a dislocated worker program administered by the Employment and
Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). TAA was first established
in 1962, but it has only been actively implemented since the Trade Act of 1974. The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Act of 1993 added a separate
NAFTA-TAA program to help workers who are affected by the free trade agreement. The
Trade Reform Act of 2002 integrated NAFTA-TAA into the regular TAA program.
When layoffs occur at a certain establishment, a group of three or more workers from
the establishment or any entity representing them may file a petition with the DOL. The
petitions are filed at the plant level. The Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance investi-
gates the case and issues a certification if they find evidence that employment of the group
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of workers is adversely affected by any of the following: shift in production to a foreign
country, increase in company imports, increase in participant imports, or high and rising
aggregate US imports. Once certified, all workers who are laid off from that establishment
between the initial layoffs (impact date) and 2 years from the certification date are entitled
to the services and benefits listed in Table 1. If a worker is over age 50, he/she may apply for
the Alternative TAA (ATAA) program instead of TAA. ATAA is a wage insurance program
that subsidizes 50% of the difference between the pre-layoff wage rate and the wage rate in
the new job, up to $10,000 a year, in case the worker obtains reemployment no later than
26 weeks from the date of separation.
The most important benefits are training and income support. If career counseling de-
termines that the participant does not have a skill useful for reemployment, the worker
may enroll in occupational skills training up to 104 weeks. If the participant lacks basic
education such as English proficiency or high school education, the participant may enroll
in remedial training for an additional 26 weeks in addition to the regular training. Train-
ing enrollment is permitted only if it is believed that the participant would benefit from
training and has a higher chance of reemployment with training. If this is not the case, the
participant may obtain a training requirement waiver. The training waiver is issued if the
participant does not need training - if she has marketable skills or will soon be recalled by
the previous employer - or is not able to take training - health issues or inability to find a
suitable training program. While enrolled in training, TAA participants are entitled to an
income support (basic TRA, additional TRA, and remedial TRA). The workers must apply
for TRA before 8 weeks from the date of certification or 16 weeks from the date of the most
recent qualified separation, whichever comes sooner. participants who obtained a training
waiver can receive the basic TRA without enrolling in a training program.
Choice of training occupation is made by participants with the help of local TAA staff
through a proper assessment of the worker’s ability. The ability assessment is measured
based on applicant’s education, work history, potential barriers to employment, basic skills
capabilities, aptitudes and work skills, family situation, attitudes toward work, behavioral
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patterns, supportive service needs, and interests for careers and training as they relate to
the local labor market. Information is gathered primarily using questionnaires, individual
interviews, paper and pencil tests, performance tests, behavioral observation, and career
guidance instruments.
3 Data
Since the initiation of the TAA program in 1962, a substantial number of workers
have received various benefits through the program. However, the collection of participant
data became obligatory only for participants who exited the program since July 1, 1999.
Throughout the last quarter of 200827 , 314,964 participant cases are reported on TAPR.
In 2005, TAPR’s coding system was revised so that reporting of occupational codes for
training and employment were unified. Prior to the 2005 revision, OSTC and OCE were
reported using various classification systems: 8-digit O*Net code, 5-digit OES code, and
9-digit DOT code. The 2005 Revision requires usage of the O*Net code. Since OSTC
and OCE are the main variables of interest, I only use observations collected after the
revision - data reported since the fourth quarter of 2005 - to avoid error due to imperfect
correspondence. This restricts the sample size to 143,301.
TAPR consists of three sections. The first section, Identification and Participant Char-
acteristics, collects personal information of participants such as date of birth, gender, eth-
nicity, and education level. Any information regarding the qualifying separation (date of
separation, tenure with previous employer, and TAA petition number) is also reported in
this section. Section II, Activity and Service Record, summarizes the TAA benefits a par-
ticipant received. If the participant received training, it reports what type of training -
occupational skills training (along with OSTC), remedial training, on-the-job training, or
customized training - he/she received. For all participants, receipt of financial assistance
27This is the reporting quarter. Each participant is monitored for three quarters from his/her date
of program exit before being reported on TAPR. The last program exit date reported by the end of
2008 is 9/30/2007.
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- basic Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA), additional TRA, remedial TRA, job search
allowance, and relocation allowance - is reported. Finally, section III, Outcomes, reports
whether the participant is employed, which occupation he/she is employed in (OCE), and
how much they earn during three quarters following the program exit.
Table 3 summarizes the data set. Columns 1 to 4 summarize data for different years
of program exit. The last column summarizes the entire sample. Individual characteristics
of the participants differ across exit years. Over time, the fraction of participants of age
55 and above increased while the fraction of workers of age between 30 and 44 noticeably
decreased. One might guess that participation of older workers is encouraged with the
establishment of the Alternative TAA (ATAA) program.28 However, with a little over 5%29
of participants of age 50 or above participating in ATAA, the hypothesis is hardly plausible.
Also, participants’ average educational attainment decreased slightly. On the other hand,
the fraction of participants with limited English ability increased. However, most of these
changes are small.
Service delivery also changed over time. First, surprisingly large fraction of participants
obtained training waivers. For the entire sample, nearly 67% of participants obtained
training waivers while 74% of the sample received training services. This implies that at
least half of the participants with training waivers end up receiving training services. This
shows that obtaining training waiver does not always imply participants’ unwillingness to
participate in training programs. The high fraction of participants with training waivers
-compared to the fraction of trainees - can be explained in two ways. First, training waiver
could be used as a tool to postpone the training enrollment process. participants who can
not find a suitable training program soon enough have an incentive to obtain a training
28ATAA was added to the regular TAA program by the TAA Reform Act of 2002. It is a wage
insurance program established to speed up reemployment of relatively older TAA participants (50
or older) who would not fully benefit from retraining. If an eligible worker accepts a job that pays
less than $50,000 annually within 26 weeks from participation, DOL provides 50% of the difference
between the previous wage and the new wage up to $10,000 for up to two years.
295.69% for 2006 and 6.35% for 2007. The participation rates for 2004 and 2005 are only 0.73% and
2.43%, respectively. This is probably because the ATAA was not fully taken advantage of for those
early participants. Participants of ATAA are also reported in the TAPR, and they are included in
the sample of this study.
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waiver because they are entitled to 26 weeks of income support, basic TRA, once obtain
the waiver. According to Table 3, 23.68% of training waivers are issued because training
enrollment is unavailable at the training enrollment deadline.30 These people may begin
their training when the program enrollment becomes available. Also participants with
marketable skills may later realize that they are not able to find a job with their existing
skill sets; therefore they enroll in training program. Second, the fraction of trainees could be
exaggerated. There are trainees who receive workshop-like training of very short duration.
Among 90,503 trainees who reported valid dates for the first and last day of training, 6,972
received training shorter than a week.
The fraction of trainees fell noticeably in 2006 while the fraction of participants who
obtained training waivers shows a large increase. However, as the fraction of trainees
increased back to the previous level in 2007, the issuance of training waivers did not decrease.
This can be explained by a substantial rise in the fraction of participants with marketable
skills for exit years 2006 and 2007. The fraction of trainees who received occupational
skills (classroom) training decreased significantly over time. This again might be explained
by the rise in the number of participants who have marketable skills. On-the-job training
is used only for a negligible fraction of trainees; but, remedial training is relatively well
utilized. Among participants who received remedial training, 42.45% had less than high
school education, and 16.39% had limited English proficiency.
Outcome variables are summarized in Table 4. The first section summarizes the outcome
measures across different exit years, and the second section summarizes them across different
levels of pre-participation earnings. The earnings level is interesting because of its linkage
to the participants’ potential outcomes. Outcome measures do not vary much across exit
years except for the matching rate which increased over time from 40% in 2004 to 50.89%
in 2007. One can clearly see that trainees have much higher chance of reemployment than
non-trainees although the difference narrows over time. Wage replacement rates are higher
30In order to receive the basic TRA, participants are required to enroll in a training program
within a certain time period from their program participation. If a participant fails to enroll before
the deadline, the only way to receive the basic TRA is by obtaining a training waiver.
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for trainees with a match compared to non-trainees. Overall, trainees with a match show
substantially higher rate of wage replacement than trainees without a match except for
exit year 2005. Also, the difference between trainees with a match and without a match is
larger than the difference between trainees without a match and non-trainees. This might
be an indication that finding a job in the training occupation indeed improves the post-
participation performance of the trainees. However, the causal relationship is ambiguous
and needs more thorough investigation. Retention rates do not differ much across exit years
and across different groups of trainees. Trainees show slightly higher retention rates than
non-trainees, and a larger fraction of trainees without a match stay employed after they are
initially hired. However, the difference is very small.
Looking at the outcome measures across different earnings levels provides another di-
mension to what we observe across exit years. First of all, matching rates are higher for
participants with low earnings level. This could be because these workers have a very limited
set of skills; they are less likely to find a job outside the training occupations. participants
within the medium range of pre-participation earnings find a job more easily than the higher
earnings group. This trend is shown by both trainees and non-trainees, but the rates are
substantially higher for trainees at all earnings levels. Wage replacement rates show a very
interesting pattern. For all levels of pre-participation earnings except for the second cat-
egory $5,000-$9,999, trainees without a match show significantly higher wage replacement
rates. However, the second category has the largest number of observations so that the
mean wage replacement rates for trainees with a match are higher than those without a
match. This shows that the link between a match and post-participation performance is
loose. Trainees show higher rates of retention compared to non-trainees, but trainees with
and without a match do not show a clear pattern.
participants’ choices of training occupations deserve a closer look. O*Net occupation
codes are composed of the first two digits representing the occupational groups, the next
four digits of occupation codes within each group, and the last two digits for additional
sub-categories. There are 23 occupation groups such as management, and business and
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financial operations. These occupation groups are listed in Table 5. Some occupation
groups, e.g. Management, are more generally applicable than others, e.g. Building and
Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance. Therefore, the probability of matching might vary
across occupational groups. Table 5 shows that the participants are widely distributed to
most of the 23 occupation groups in their training choices, while employment is concentrated
in a few groups.
Tables 6 and 7 summarize individual characteristics of participants and the matching
rate for each occupation group of their training occupations and occupations of employment.
The first column shows that matching rates vary greatly across different occupation groups.
Especially, the matching rates shown in Table 7 show that the majority of employees in some
occupations groups - legal (23) and healthcare practitioners and technical (29) - received
training specific to the occupations, while training does not seem necessary to be employed
in some occupations - sales and related (41) and farming, fishing, and forestry (45).
Gender is vastly relevant for the participants’ occupational choices. While some oc-
cupation groups - construction and extraction (47), installation, maintenance, and repair
(49) , and transportation and material moving (53) - are extremely male-oriented, some
occupations groups - legal (23), healthcare support (31), and office and administrative sup-
port (43) - are highly female-oriented. This pattern is preserved for occupations groups
of employment. The importance of English proficiency also differs greatly across occupa-
tions. In training choices, people with limited English proficiency show high concentration
in three occupation groups - food preparation and serving related (35), building and grounds
cleaning and maintenance (37), and personal care and service (39). These three occupation
groups hire more workers with limited English proficiency, but farming, fishing, and forestry
group (45) is the major employer of these workers.
Table 6 also shows that different ethnic groups choose different occupations. Training
in farming, fishing, and forestry (45) is the most popular choice for white participants
while Asians choose to be trained for occupation group building and grounds cleaning and
maintenance (37) and personal care and service (39). African American participants tend
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to choose community and social services (21) and education, training, and library (25),
Hispanic participants choose personal care and services (39) and office and administrative
support (43). These choices are reflected in their employment as well. One noticeable
thing, though, is the high concentration of Asian participants employed in architecture and
engineering (17) and Hispanic participants in military specific (55). However, the military
group is too small for this high concentration of Hispanic employees to be meaningful. The
level of education is a very important factor in choosing occupations. Trainees with different
education levels display distinctive choices of occupation groups. This pattern is preserved
in their employment with higher intensity.
Table 8 summarizes the link between occupational choices and post-participation per-
formance. Occupational choices certainly matter for the chance of reemployment after
training. Reemployment rates range from 71.43% for farming, fishing, and forestry (45)
to 88.79% for protective service (33). Once employed, retention rates and wage replace-
ment differ across the occupations of employment. Architecture and engineering (17) and
healthcare practitioners and technical (29) show superior post-participation performance
with high retention and wage replacement rates. Since choices of occupation influence the
post-participation outcomes, and different personal characteristics show different patterns
of occupational choice, it is expected that gender, ethnicity, and education level are linked
to the outcomes.
4 Analysis
As shown in the previous section, matching is linked with various personal characteris-
tics of participants, and the outcomes of the program are not only influenced by matching
but also by many other individual characteristics. In this section, I investigate the effect
of each variable on matching and on other outcome measures. This is to improve our un-
derstanding on how matching is achieved and how the performance of the TAA program
can improve through better matching. First, I look at how individual characteristics of
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participants influence the probability of a match. Then, I look at how matching and other
characteristics of participants affect the outcome - probability of reemployment, wage re-
placement rate, post-participation earnings, and probability of remaining employed.
4.1 What affects Matching?
In a non-experimental setting, there always is a selection into participation in a social
program. The TAA program is not an exception. Basic TRA is paid to the participants
only after their unemployment insurance benefits exhaust; therefore, people who are able to
find desirable work - potentially those people with better education and skill sets - within
26 weeks from separation would not participate in the TAA program. However, this se-
lection issue is not the main focus of this project. More relevant issues are selection into
occupational skills training and having a match between OSTC and OCE. All participants
receive employment counseling and career assessment. Occupational skills training is rec-
ommended to participants who can benefit the most from it: possibly participants with
higher learning ability. Matches also have selection problem. If a match between OSTC
and OCE is a preferred employment option to a non-match, the selection problem would
be relatively well defined. For instance, workers who have high ability would tend to have
a match, and better wage replacement rates and retention rates. In this case, the high
correlation between a match and better outcome measures is caused by trainees with high
ability selecting into a match. However, in practice, a match may not be an indicator of
higher ability. Some trainees might choose a non-match occupation because it offers more
desirable compensation or work environment, but others might fail to find a match because
they were not qualified for the occupation that they were trained for. In order to understand
the selection into a match, I investigate the impact of various personal characteristics on
the probability of a match.
The outcome variable here is the match. ‘1’ indicates a match and ‘0’ indicates a match
133
failure. I use Probit analysis for this analysis as the following:
Pr(Matchi = 1) = c + αOCCi + βXi + δ1D5i + δ2D6i + δ3D7i + εi (70)
OCCi is a vector of dummy variables for the occupation groups listed in Table 5. ‘1’ indicates
the occupation group of training. As shown in Table 6 and 7, the probability of matching
varies across occupation group. Vector α will capture such variation. X is a vector of
individual characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, completion of
training, and age at program exit. D5i, D6i, and D7i are dummy variables for exit years.
Reemployment depends on the economic situation at the end of training; some years might
have a generally lower probability of matching due to recession. For this estimation, only
the observations with valid OSTC and OCE will be used. Therefore, all participants used
in the analysis necessarily received occupational skills training. For this reason, only the
selection into a match will be investigated.
There are six specifications. Specification 1 uses only the personal characteristics in-
cluded in vector X. The reference group for this specification is white females with less than
high school education between ages 41 and 50. Specification 2 also includes the years of
exit, 2005, 2006, and 2007. The reference year is 2004. Specification 3 includes 21 indicator
variables for occupation groups of training. Group 11, Management, is used as a reference
group. Also, occupation group 55, Military Specific, is omitted since training and hiring
process for military personnel is different from other occupation groups. Group 55 only
accounts for 0.07%31 of the sample, so it would not affect the analysis in a significant way.
Specification 4 includes both years of program exit and occupations groups. Specification
5 includes states of participants. California is used as reference group. Specification 6 in-
cludes years of exit as well as states. These six specifications will be used for other analysis.
For each specification, I perform the analysis with or without the indicator variable for
training completion. This is because completion of training might be endogenous. Again,
31This is different from the figure shown in the fifth column of Table 5 because it is calculated
from the observations with valid codes for both OSTC and OCE.
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there are two measures of education used in the analysis. First, education is measured as
degree attainment, so five dummy variables for high school degree or equivalent, some col-
lege, associate degree, bachelor’s degree, and more than bachelor’s degree are used. Second
measure of education is years of schooling. Analyses using the first measure are marked
with ‘a,’ and those using the second measure are marked with ‘b.’
For this analysis, observations from states Oklahoma and Virginia are omitted because
they show 100% and 99.97% of matching rate. This is shown in Table 9. Although this is
not impossible, it is likely a result of miscoding. The sample from Oklahoma and Virginia
accounts for 5.00% of the sample. The matching rate for observations with valid OSTC
and OCE code decreases to 34.25% from 44.56% if Oklahoma and Virginia observations are
excluded.
Table 10.a. summarizes how individual characteristics affect matching. The numbers
reported are the marginal effect of each variable on the chance of matching. One hypoth-
esis to consider is that a match is a result of the participant’s successful performance in
training. There are two variables that might indicate the success in training; one is training
completion and the other is education. Education is a less direct indicator, but a proxy for
learning ability. In all specifications, completion of training is very significant. Considering
that the matching rate for the sample studied here is 34.25%, completion of training rais-
ing the chance of matching by 22 to 26 percentage points, depending on specifications, is
substantial. However, training completion could be endogenous. participants might with-
draw from training because they find a job that does not require completion of the current
training, and that is better than the ones that they can potentially get after completion.
Alternatively, they might withdraw because they find that the occupational choices were
not optimal - they find the occupations uninteresting, or they are not able to learn the ma-
terial properly. In either case, the occupation of employment is likely to be different from
that of training. This causes a selection problem. Non-completion occurs when a match is
not desirable or not attainable, enforcing high correlation between completion and a match.
Education, as a proxy for learning ability, is expected to help success of training, hence a
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match. However, the first column of Table 10.a shows that a higher level of education has a
negative or insignificant effect on matching, providing evidence against this hypothesis. One
explanation of why highly educated participants - Bachelor’s degree or more - do not show a
significantly higher matching rate than people who did not complete high school education
can be taken from Table 6. More educated people tend to choose occupations that are more
generally applicable, such as management. According to Table 6, trainees with Bachelor’s
degree or more account for 5.58% of the sample, but account for 12.95% of management.
The matching rate for the management group is only 25.48%, which is substantially lower
than 44.60%. Besides management, trainees with bachelor’s degree or more show high
concentration in business and financial operations (13), computer and mathematical (15),
architecture and engineering (17), and education, training, and library (25) in which skill
sets are less occupation specific. In this case, matching may not be a dominant choice
for employment, so they might be indifferent between a match and no match, reducing
the matching rate for highly educated people. On the other hand, the less educated show
more concentration on healthcare support (31), food preparation and serving related (35),
building and grounds cleaning and maintenance (37), production (51), and transportation
and material moving (53), which are more job specific. This hypothesis is supported by
specifications 3 and 4. Once occupation groups are added, higher education levels become
significant and positive. The occupations with high concentration of less educated people
match with the occupation groups that have significantly positive effects on matching in
specifications 3 and 4.
Ethnicity is another important factor. Asians and African Americans show significantly
lower matching rates than white participants, and this is stable across specifications. How-
ever, Hispanic participants show a significantly higher matching rate than white participants
only if training completion is included in the analysis. Hispanic participants indeed show
a higher rate of training completion (85.12% compared to 79.04% for all ethnicities). Age
at the time of program exit is very significant and the size of the effect is stable across
specifications. The highest matching rate is shown by trainees with age between 21 and 40,
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approximately 4 percentage points higher than age group 41-50. The youngest group shows
the same rate as the reference group, and matching decreases with age. This indicates the
upside-down U-shape curve for the relationship between matching and age. Inclusion of the
years of exit does not affect other variables, but it is significant. It also indicates that the
labor market in 2004, the reference year, is typically bad.
Inclusion of states changes the effects of most variables besides age. This is because
composition of TAA participants differs greatly across states. This is shown in Table 9
along with gender, English proficiency, ethnicity, and levels of education as a fraction of
observations for each state. Limited English proficiency varies greatly across states ranging
from 0 in some states to 23.64% in California and 33.3% in Rhode Island. When states
are added into the analysis, limited English proficiency is found to lower the matching rate
significantly by 12 percentage points. Also, the ethnicity indicator for Hispanics becomes
one of the most important factors lowering the chance of matching by 23 to 24 percentage
points. In magnitude, it is as big as training completion. Besides changing the size of the
effects of other variables, state variables are very significant themselves. The significance
of states can stem from two reasons. First, the labor market situation differs across states,
so the performance of job applicants would differ as well. Second, state variables might
be capturing the quality of coding that differs across states. The second column in Table
9 shows the matching rate for each state. The matching rates range from 0% (Alabama,
Arizona and a few others) to 99.97% (Virginia) and 100% (Oklahoma). It is plausible that
such a great range is caused by coding issues. Inclusion of state variables will control for
those problems.
Table 10.b. shows the same analysis using years of schooling as a measure of education
level. The size and sign of the effects of all variables are basically unaffected. Schooling
again shows a significant and negative effect on the chance of matching.
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4.2 Effects of training and training with match on Outcome Measures
The conventional literature on evaluation of training programs compares trainees to
non-trainees. That comparison asks a simple question - Does training work? However, it
does not answer why training works. If trainees’ outcome measures are significantly better
than those of non-trainees, it could be because what they need is successful transition away
from the previous occupations - for which any type of training suffices - or because they
need transition into a specific occupation, so that which training you get becomes very
relevant for reemployment.
If the outcome measures of non-trainees do not differ from those of trainees, the failure
might arise from three possible reasons. First, training was not necessary, and all partic-
ipants generally had marketable skills already. Second, training does not work properly;
that is, the training programs are poorly designed to teach the participants proper skill sets.
And the last, training works, but occupational choices are poorly made; that is, training did
not help participants to earn the skills that are in demand - the occupations with vacancies
- even though the participants successfully acquired new skill sets. It is important to fig-
ure out which is causing the failure of training programs because each cause has different
solutions.
All these possible stories can be summarized in two questions: does training works in
general? and does a choice of training occupation affect the impact of training? For the
first question, instead of simply comparing trainees and non-trainees, I compare trainees
without a match to non-trainees, so as to truly test the general validity of training. The
second question can be answered by comparing trainees with a match and trainees without
a match.
Using the following estimation equation, I can answer both.









+ βXi + δ1D5i + δ1D6i + δ1D7i + εi (71)
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The outcome variable, Yi, is any one of the outcome measures - reemployment, post-
participation earnings, wage replacement rate, and retention rate. Depending on the de-
pendent variable, I use either Probit analysis - for reemployment rate and retention rate -
or OLS - for earnings and wage replacement rate. TR’s are indicator variables for various
types of training, TRocci is 1 if participant i received occupational skills training. TR
rmd
i ,
TRojti , and TR
cst
i are indicator variables for remedial training, on-the-job training, and cus-
tomized training, respectively. Mocci is the matching variable - 1 if matched, 0 otherwise.
X is a vector of individual characteristics of participants that are used in the first analysis.
D5i, D6i, and D7i are dummy variables for exit years.
α1 captures the impact of matching on the various outcome measures. α2, on the
other hand, captures the effect of skill training without leading to a matching. Therefore,
the difference between α1 and α2 will provide the comparison between skill trainees with
and without a match. α2 itself measure the impact of occupational skills training over
no training. Positive α1 implies that the choice of training occupation is relevant to the
outcome, and the occupational choice should be made with caution. If neither α1 and α2 is
significant, it comes down to either ‘occupational skills training is not necessary’ or ‘training
programs are not a good source of new skills.’ Good outcome measures for both trainees
and non-trainees would signal toward the former, poor overall performance would signal
the latter. α3 to α5 capture the effect of remedial training, OJT, and customized training
in general.
4.2.1 Reemployment Rate
The dependent variable is an indicator variable for employment. It takes the value 1
if a participant is employed for at least one quarter during three quarters following exit.
In this analysis, the major comparison is between trainees and non-trainees. I perform
Probit analysis. Matching should not be included in this analysis because the participants
with match are necessarily all employed. Therefore, the observations from Oklahoma and
Virginia are included. Table 11 summarizes the analysis. Only specifications from 1 to 5
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are used.
First, all types of training except for remedial training influence the chance of reem-
ployment significantly. The biggest effect comes from on-the-job training. This is expected
because employers can enjoy the benefit only by actually hiring the trainees. However,
the employment under OJT does not necessarily continue after the training period. In
the sample, 86.18%32 of OJT trainees are employed at least for one quarter during three
quarters following exit. That is, 13.82% of them lose their employment after their OJT
period expires. Occupational skills training improves the chance of reemployment while
customized training lowers it. Customized training is the training program that is specially
designed to meet the skill needs of a specific firm. That is, if a trainee is not hired by the
firm, the skills acquired through this training may not be applicable to other jobs. More
education improves the chance of reemployment, and the size of the effect is stable across
specifications except for specification 5 with state variables.
Age variables again show the upside-down U-shape. The highest reemployment rates
are shown for age group between 21 and 30, and decreases with age. Especially participants
with age between 61 and 65 show substantially lower reemployment rate compared to other
age groups. This could be discrimination against older job applicants at the hiring process
or voluntary withdrawal from the job market by participants who are close to retirement.
Among 9,069 participants between 61 and 65 who obtained a training requirement waiver,
810 (8.9%) reported retirement as a reason. This is surprisingly high considering that only
1.02% of training waivers issued - for all age groups - are issued for the reason of retirement.
Ethnicity also matters, but the magnitude of the effect is smaller than education or training.
Gender and English proficiency do not matter significantly. The exit years are also not
significant. This indicates that people do find a job somehow even if the overall quality
deteriorates in bad labor market situations.
Specifications b, education measured as years of schooling, show the same result as
specifications a. The effect of an additional year of schooling is significant and negative,
32Compared to 82.83% for classroom skill training trainees, 77.55% for remedial trainees, and
81.70% for customized training trainees
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but the magnitude is small compared to education measured as degree. This can be an
indication of a nonlinear relationship between education and reemployment rates.
4.2.2 Post-Participation Earnings
The dependent variable is the logarithm of average quarterly earnings during the three
quarters following exit. This analysis utilizes the matching variable, so the observations
from Oklahoma and Virginia are excluded. Also, participants who received occupational
skills training but do not have occupational codes (OSTC) are excluded. Since the match
indicator is 1 if there is a match and 0 otherwise, the participants who have a match that
is not reported are treated the same as people who failed at a match. In order to avoid
bias, trainees with no OSTC reported should be omitted. For each specification, I try the
analysis without or with the log of earnings prior to participation. Tables 12.a and 12.b
summarize the analysis with two measures of education.
The pre-participation earnings variable is very significant and large in magnitude; that
is, people with high earnings prior to participation still earn more than people with low
pre-participation earnings. This is not surprising because higher earnings generally indicate
higher education and skill level. Even after the layoffs, people with higher education and
sophisticated skill sets find a job with higher earnings. For that reason, pre-participation
earnings might very well be highly correlated with the level of education. In both speci-
fications a and b, inclusion of pre-participation earnings reduces the size of coefficients on
education variables by half. Still, the significance and the signs of education variables are
not hurt by the pre-participation earnings. Education is certainly a very important factor
for earnings with a larger effect for higher level degrees.
Having a match is a significant factor that improves post-program earnings. However,
the magnitude is smaller than the effect of an additional degree. The level of education de-
termines the participants’ class of earnings potential while match can only improve trainees’
earnings within the class. On the other hand, participants who received occupational skills
training but failed to find a match earn less than non-trainees which is the reference group.
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This might be because the participants for whom occupational skills training is necessary
are more likely to have a very limited skill set; once they failed to find a job in the occupa-
tion that they are trained for, it is rather difficult to find a job with comparable pay. The
negative effects of remedial training can be explained with similar logic. The participants
who need remedial training have the lowest level of education, which results in low earnings.
Ethnicity matters in an interesting way. Asians have higher post-program earning than
white participants while African American and Hispanic participants have lower earnings.
The difference in earning levels across ethnic groups can be explained by their different oc-
cupational choices. Table 6 shows how different ethnic groups choose different occupation
groups and Table 9 summarizes the mean earning level of each occupation group. Accord-
ing to Table 9, the five occupation groups with highest earnings are groups 11, 13, 15, 17,
19, and 27. The lowest earnings groups are 31, 35, 39, 41, and 45. From Tables 6 and
7, we can see that only White and Asian trainees show high concentration in high earn-
ings groups for their training choices and also employment. Especially, Asians show high
concentration in architecture and engineering, the highest earnings group, in their employ-
ment. Although Asian trainees also show high concentration in low earnings groups, African
American trainees are very highly concentrated in those groups in their employment. All
three occupation groups with high concentration of Hispanic trainees belong to the low
earnings groups.
Gender is also very significant and large. Male in general has higher earnings than
female, and the reduction in coefficient with inclusion of pre-participation earnings indicates
that they used to earn more than female workers prior to participation. Age again shows
the upside-down U-shape. participants with age between 41-50 make the highest earnings,
followed by age group 31-40. Younger workers and older workers generally have lower
earning. Exit years matter significantly for the earnings. In years with a better labor
market situation (2007), participants receive higher earnings than they would have received
in a bad year (2004).
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4.2.3 Wage Replacement Rates
Wage replacement rates are the ratio of post-participation earnings to pre-participation
earnings. Each earnings level takes the average quarterly earnings during three quarters
preceding participation and three quarters following exit. For the same reason as in the pre-
vious section, observations from Oklahoma and Virginia are excluded. Trainees who received
Occupational skills training without OSTC are also omitted. Again, each specification will
be analyzed with or without pre-participation earnings. The results are summarized by
Tables 13.a and 13.b.
One noticeable thing for this analysis is that the effects of education variables have op-
posite signs when pre-participation earnings are included. That is, participants with higher
education generally suffer from larger earnings loss, but they suffer smaller earnings loss
compared to people with the same pre-participation earnings and lower educational attain-
ment. The large and negative coefficient on pre-participation earnings indicates convergence
in earnings after participation. The standard deviation of post-participation earnings is
$4011.10, which is 18.44% smaller than that of pre-participation earnings. The education
variables are not affected by controlling for states.
Matching improves the wage replacement rates of trainees significantly regardless of
inclusion of pre-participation earnings. The size of its effect becomes larger with pre-
participation earnings controlled for, making the effect of occupational skills training with-
out a match negative. This negativity can again be explained by the limited skill sets that
these trainees have. For a similar reason, remedial training lowers the wage replacement
rates. Gender is significant and not affected by pre-participation earnings. Male partici-
pants suffer 1 to 2 percentage point smaller earnings loss than female participants.
Age shows a rather linear relationship in this section. The younger a participant is,
the higher the wage replacement rate is. However, the upside-down U-shape relationship is
restored by controlling for pre-participation earnings. Age variables are also not affected by
controlling for states. Exit years are very significant and not affected by pre-participation
earnings or state variables. Hispanic participants show higher wage replacement rates, but
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this is due to low pre-participation earnings. This is shown by negative marginal effect with
pre-participation earnings. Higher wage replacement rates for Asian participants when pre-
participation earnings are controlled for is likely to be caused by the selection into high
earning occupation groups in their employment.
4.2.4 Retention Rates
The indicator variable for retention is 1 if a participant is still employed during the
remainder of the observation period (up to three quarters) once she is employed, and 0
otherwise. I perform a Probit analysis in this section. Since the matching variable is used,
observations from Oklahoma and Virginia are omitted as well as the trainees who received
occupational skills training but do not have OSTC reported. Table 14 summarizes the
results for both education measures. The analyses with pre-participation earnings do not
differ significantly from the ones without it, so are not reported.
Matching does not affect retention rates and neither does ethnicity. Occupational skills
training and OJT improves the retention rate, but occupational skills training becomes
insignificant as the occupational groups are controlled for. This shows that OJT helps the
trainees get employed and stay employed. The upside-down U-shape relationship for the
age variable does not show for the retention rate. Older participants generally have lower
retention rates, but the youngest workers show the same retention rate as the reference
group of age between 41 and 50.
Gender is significant, but the size is very small. Female participants have less than 1
percentage point higher retention rate than male participants. Gender becomes insignif-
icant when occupation groups are added indicating that females choose occupations that
have slightly higher retention rates. No occupation group shows a significantly lower rate
than group 11. The groups with significantly higher retention rate than group 11, by 2-3
percentage points, are groups 21, 23, 29, 31, and 43. According to Tables 6 and 7, male
workers account for a very small fraction of these groups, supporting the hypothesis that
female participants select into occupations with higher retention rates. States have very
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little effect on the results. Overall, the retention rate for the entire sample is quite high
(around 90%), and the variables of individual characteristics and service received have very
small effects even if they are significant.
5 Conclusion
Technology continues to advance and it becomes easier to utilize various resources in
foreign countries by means of international trade. Imports of cheaper final goods used to be
blamed for replacing domestic goods and jobs of workers who produced the goods that were
replaced, but the rise of offshore outsourcing has certainly made the replacement more direct
and massive. As most of labor-intensive manufacturing production no longer takes place in
the U.S., many factory workers go through painful layoffs. Now with the improvement of
network technology, this trend is expanding to service workers.
In order to reduce the adjustment costs of these workers, the US Department of Labor
established a dislocated worker program called TAA. Since the workers who are displaced by
rising import competition tend to be less educated and have limited skill sets, TAA focuses
on providing its participants the opportunities to acquire new skills that are in demand in
order to improve their chance of reemployment. In this paper, I investigate whether such
occupational skills training truly helps participants to find stable employment that also pays
relatively well. I look into the match between the occupation of training and employment.
First I investigate how individual characteristics of participants affect the chance of
matching. One hypothesis that I look into is that matching is the result of successful
training. This hypothesis is supported by a largely positive effect of training completion.
Trainees who completed the occupational skills training have 25 percentage points higher
chance of matching compared to those who did not complete their training. This is a
very large effect considering that the probability of matching for the sample is 34.25%.
However, the validity of training completion as an indication of successful training is rather
questionable due to potential endogeneity. Alternatively I use educational attainment as a
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proxy for learning ability, which in turn leads to success in training classes. Interestingly,
education displays a negative or insignificant effect on matching. This insignificance, though,
is not robust. When occupation groups are controlled for, the effect of education becomes
positive; this supports the hypothesis that learning ability improves the chance of matching.
What seems more important is which occupation a trainee chooses as a training occupation.
If a trainee chooses a managerial occupation, the skills that are acquired through training
can be applied to other occupations. For this reason, trainees of occupation group 11,
management, experience lower matching rates. Training in a certain production technique
tends to lead to a match. In other words, a match is a preferred choice of employment for
some occupation groups while it is not for other groups.
Investigation of reemployment rates shows that occupational skills training and OJT
improves the chance of reemployment by 5 and 10 percentage points, respectively. Education
also helps. participants with Bachelor’s degree show 5 percentage points higher chance of
reemployment compared to those with less than a high school degree. The most important
determinant of the reemployment rate, though, is the age of the participants. Age shows
an upside-down U-shape relationship with the reemployment rate, but the negative slope
at old age is substantially larger than the positive slope at young age. participants with age
between 21 and 30 are 4 percentage points more likely to be reemployed, while participants
with age between 51 and 60 are 10 percentage points less likely than people of age between
41 and 50.
Matching affects both post-participation earnings and the wage replacement rate signif-
icantly. Matching raises the wage replacement rate by 3 to 4 percentage points. This effect
is not affected by different occupational choices by participants for both outcome measures.
The impact of larger magnitude for the earnings level comes from education and age. The
impact of having education of more than a Bachelor’s degree is 10 times larger than the
impact of having a match. Age again shows an upside-down U-shape relationship, with the
highest earnings for participants of age between 41 and 50. The magnitude of the impact of
education is much smaller for wage replacement, very similar to that of a match. However,
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age has a very large and monotonically decreasing impact. Workers of age between 16 and
21 have 27 percentage points higher wage replacement rate than those of age between 41
and 50. Workers of age between 61 and 65 show 15 to 18 percentage points smaller rates
compared to the 41-50 age group.
Matching does not influence the retention rate by much. OJT is the biggest contributor
in improving the retention rate, raising the rate by more than 3 percentage points. Educa-
tion is another important factor; however the impact is still smaller than 2%. Occupational
Skills training improves the rate by 1 percentage point. Retention rate for the sample is
90% and seems to be affected by factors other than personal characteristics of participants
or service delivery of the TAA program.
In conclusion, achieving a match is important in improving post-participation outcomes
of participants. Even though the outcome measures are more largely affected by the partic-
ipants’ education level or age, the improvement by training and the resulting match is the
contribution of the TAA program. The results show that although outcome measures for
trainees are generally better than non-trainees, occupational skills training alone - training
that does not lead to a match - does not improve the outcome measure. Therefore, the
TAA program should place more emphasis on career assessment and counseling so that
participants can choose an occupation that is suitable for their needs and ability which will
directly lead to employment in that occupation.
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Inform workers of various services available for them. 
Available for all displaced workers, certification not necessary 
Reemployment 
Services 
Assist workers with reemployment by providing career counseling and assessment, job 
search related workshops, job search assistance and referrals. Career assessment 
determines whether and which training is beneficial to each participant. 
Relocation 
Allowance 
When a participant gets a job that requires moving, the program compensates 90% of 









Training Participants are eligible for training up to 104 weeks. 
To be eligible, the following criteria must be met: 
   i) no suitable employment 
   ii) training would be beneficial to the worker 
   iii) training would lead to employment 
   iv) training must be available 
   v) the workers would be able to complete the training 
   vi) training cost is reasonable 
Training waiver may be issued 
to a participant if  
   i) she will be recalled soon 
   ii) she has marketable skills 
   iii) she has a health problem        
   iv) training is not available 
   v) enrollment is not available 
 Classroom 
Training 
Targeted to obtain skill sets that are specific to an occupation of choice.  
Training provided by local community colleges or vocational training schools. 
 Remedial 
Training 
Eg. Literacy, English as a Second Language (ESL), and GED 
Can occur concurrently with other training or during additional 26 weeks 
from the end of regular training 
 On the Job 
Training(OJT) 
If a participant is employed under OJT, the TAA program pays 50% of the 
wage rate to the employer during the training 
 Customized 
Training 
The training is customized to tasks of a specific firm, but the trainees are not 




A participant is eligible to receive income support for up to 104 weeks as the following: 
     i) 26 weeks following separation: UI 
     ii) 26 weeks following exhaustion of UI: Basic TRA 
     iii) 52 weeks following exhaustion of Basic TRA: Additional TRA 




 i) the participant has obtained a training waiver 
 ii) has completed approved training 
 Additional TRA During 52 weeks from exhaustion of Basic TRA. Training 
enrollment is required without exception. 
 Remedial TRA Participants who are enrolled in remedial training qualify for 26 
weeks of income support in addition to 104 weeks of UI, basic 





This is a subsidy of 65% of the qualifying health insurance premium paid. The subsidy will be 
paid as a Tax Credit. All TAA and NAFTA-TAA participants all are eligible. 
Source: Employment and Training Administration, DOL (http://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/benefits.cfm) 
(a) Max $800 prior to Reform Act of 2002 
(b) These exceptions do not apply to NAFTA-TAA participants. Training enrollment is required for NAFTA-
TAA participants to receive basic TRA.  
(c) This is added to TAA benefits by 2002 Reform Act 
 
 









































Goal Outcome Goal Outcome Goal Outcome Goal Outcome 
2003 1,894 197,748 90 73   78 62 90 86 
2004 1,813 149,705 90 74   70 63 88 89 
2005 1,564 118,024 80 76   70 70 89 91 
2006 1,448 119,605 80 89   70 72 85 90 
2007 1,465 146,898   12,000 13,915 70 70 85 88 
Source : ETA, US Department of Labor  (http://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/taa_stats.cfm)  
(i) These figures are constructed from the number of workers indicated in petition forms. The report is 
supposed to be an approximate number; therefore, these figures differ from the actual number of workers 
covered by the petitions certified in each year.  
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Table 4.3. Summary Statistics of Participants across Years of Program Exit 
Year of Program Exit 2004 2005 2006 2007 All 
Number of Participants 27,559
(ii)





      
    Gender      
        Male 49.51 51.36 52.37 53.21 51.65 
        Female  50.49 48.64 47.63 46.79 48.35 
    Age at Participation      
        Under 30 10.25 9.53 9.32 9.11 9.53 
        30-44 39.88 38.13 35.99 33.51 36.97 
        45-54 32.17 33.15 33.57 34.89 33.40 
        55 and more 17.70 19.20 21.12 22.50 20.10 
        Mean Age at Participation (years) 44.02 44.58 45.12 45.62 44.83 
    Ethnicity      
        Hispanic/Latino 13.93 10.45 6.22 5.65 8.87 
        American Indian/Alaska Native 0.99 0.77 1.00 0.94 0.92 
        Asian 4.00 3.48 2.32 2.31 2.99 
        Black or African American 16.07 13.79 15.14 16.13 15.07 
        Hawaiian Native or Pacific Islander 0.44 0.35 0.29 0.28 0.33 
        White 64.57 71.16 75.04 74.69 71.82 
    Education      
        Less than High School 19.88 18.45 20.16 20.49 19.63 
        High School Graduate or Eqv. 54.34 55.73 55.95 55.43 55.49 
        Some Post High School 19.83 19.61 17.81 17.37 18.70 
        College Graduate or Eqv. 5.47 5.78 5.37 5.95 5.62 
        Not Identified 0.48 0.43 0.71 0.76 0.56 
    English Proficiency      
        Not Proficient 5.13 5.23 4.20 4.13 4.70 
Benefits & Services Received
(i)
      
    Received Any Training 76.12 76.61 69.76 75.44 74.20 
        Among Trainees       
           Occupational Skill Training 70.82 71.76 66.40 54.95 66.98 
           On-The-Job Training 3.78 3.00 0.88 0.62 2.14 
           Remedial Training 14.33 14.63 16.97 16.32 15.57 
           Completed Training 68.90 65.82 59.12 48.96 61.39 
           Average Weeks of Training 57.64 wks 61.42wks 63.67wks 61.25wks 61.19wks 
           Rec’d Travel Allowance 11.55 14.57 17.93 13.34 14.72 
           Rec’d Subsistence Allowance  1.91 1.32 1.14 0.72 1.28 
    Training Waiver  56.07 57.21 70.48 76.73 64.60 
           Recall 7.03 8.50 8.98 1.84 6.98 
           Marketable Skills 36.93 43.77 59.76 72.45 54.16 
           Retirement 0.97 1.16 1.91 2.11 1.58 
           Health problem 1.88 0.89 0.27 0.58 0.78 
           Enrollment/Training Unavailable 23.68 20.39 19.30 20.30 20.55 
           Reason unknown 29.50 25.28 9.77 2.72 15.94 
    Basic TRA 61.29 63.52 61.08 56.83 61.13 
    Additional TRA 30.40 35.57 30.87 26.18 31.43 
    Job Search Allowance 1.07 1.12 1.59 1.99 1.41 
    Relocation Allowance 1.03 1.14 1.47 1.46 1.28 
(i)   Units in % unless specified otherwise. 
(ii)  Numbers of participants in 2004 and 2007 are smaller because the data are not collected throughout the whole 
year.  
 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Code Obs. %  Obs. %  Occupation Group 
11 3,050 4.88  1,294 3.29  Management 
13 1,779 2.85  712 1.81  Business and Financial Operations 
15 4,085 6.54  1,421 3.62  Computer and Mathematical 
17 2,323 3.72  1,440 3.67  Architecture and Engineering 
19 429 0.69  167 0.43  Life, Physical and Social Science 
21 977 1.56  350 0.89  Community and Social Services 
23 474 0.76  132 0.34  Legal 
25 2,213 3.54  861 2.19  Education, Training, and Library 
27 636 1.02  264 0.67  Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media 
29 6,069 9.71  2,212 5.63  Healthcare Practitioners and Technical 
31 6,501 10.41  2,610 6.64  Healthcare support 
33 678 1.09  434 1.10  Protective Service 
35 551 0.88  616 1.57  Food Preparation and Serving Related 
37 362 0.58  854 2.17  Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance 
39 1,759 2.82  854 2.17  Personal Care and Service 
41 437 0.70  1,227 3.12  Sales and Related 
43 8,985 14.38  4,401 11.20  Office and Administrative Support 
45 91 0.15  255 0.65  Farming, Fishing, and Forestry 
47 1,924 3.08  1,287 3.28  Construction, and Extraction 
49 6,171 9.88  2,863 7.29  Installation, Maintenance, and Repair 
51 7,940 12.71  11,518 29.32  Production 
53 4,994 7.99  3,474 8.84  Transportation and Material Moving 
55 45 0.07  42 0.11  Military Specific 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average  Quarterly 
Earnings ($) 
11 82.69  91.01 87.25 10,489 
13 82.12  91.27 93.93 9,528 
15 81.57  90.23 95.81 9,757 
17 83.60  93.75 103.27 12,224 
19 82.98  92.21 87.12 9,072 
21 83.11  94.10 87.65 5,977 
23 83.97  90.76 89.03 7,325 
25 80.70  92.97 77.14 6,163 
27 76.10  89.61 93.33 9,372 
29 87.79  94.11 106.44 8,130 
31 87.09  92.80 85.83 5,280 
33 88.79  94.09 90.11 6,911 
35 81.67  90.40 80.00 4,645 
37 77.62  90.00 88.39 5,658 
39 73.39  87.46 87.48 5,070 
41 75.29  90.13 78.20 5,627 
43 80.80  91.79 84.20 6,216 
45 71.43  63.11 91.59 5,583 
47 78.07  88.21 91.37 8,440 
49 83.97  91.78 89.99 8,918 
51 80.50  91.88 96.67 7,301 
53 85.84  89.44 94.58 7,348 
55 73.33  91.43 82.94 7,167 
Total 82.85  91.37 91.48 7,475 
(i)  For each occupation group of training. 
(ii) For each occupation group of reemployment. These observations include both trainees and 
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This dissertation investigates how the increase in international trade, expanded to the
practice of offshore outsourcing, affects labor markets in developed countries, especially the
US, and how the government compensates the displaced workers. The second and third
chapters focus on theoretical and numerical analyses of the various employment effects of
offshore outsourcing. The fourth chapter presents the empirical analysis of the efficacy of
the TAA program, which is designed to help the workers who are displaced due to rising
import competition and offshore outsourcing.
In chapters II and III, firms are initially in an open economy equilibrium without offshore
outsourcing. The business process of each firm is composed of two segments - assembly and
services. As technology advances, physical separation of the two segments becomes possible,
so that firms can, if it is profitable, send either or both segments to a foreign country where
the wage rate and productivity level differs. The Home country is the north (a developed
country). Chapters II and III make different assumptions within this basic setup and
examine different issues. Chapter II make the following three assumptions. First, firms are
heterogeneous in their productivity levels, so they respond to the feasibility of outsourcing
differently. Second, the competing foreign country is also in the north and is identical to the
home country. The Southern country in this chapter is only a host of outsourcing activities
and does not have a market for the finished product. Finally, only the assembly segment is
outsourceable. The assumptions made in chapter III are the following. First, firms produce
175
unique varieties; but they have identical productivity levels. Therefore, all firms in one
country make the same decision, and the aggregate effect is proportional to the firm-level
effect. Second, the competing foreign country is the south. South has a lower wage and
is less productive in the service segment. Third, both assembly and service segments are
outsourceable. In case the relative productivity of service segment of northern firms is very
high, we may observe that southern firms outsource their service segments to the north.
Two-way outsourcing - one country specializing in one segment - is also possible. In both
chapters, I quantify various employment effects by calibrating model parameters to the U.S.
manufacturing sector.
The theoretical analysis of Chapter II finds that offshore outsourcing reduces home
employment unambiguously. When outsourcing becomes a feasible option with a fixed cost,
different firms respond differently. The most productive firms outsource; the firms with
medium productivity stay as non-outsourcers, and the least productive firms are forced to
exit due to the lack of competitiveness. This last is called the cleansing effect.
In the numerical analysis, I find that the cleansing effect accounts for the majority of
the net job destruction. The net employment effect of outsourcing firms alone is ambiguous;
signs and magnitude change depending on the parameter values. This is a very important
finding because it suggests that the results from currently available empirical studies on this
subject do not capture the whole story. Most of these investigate the substitution between
employment in the headquarter countries and at the foreign affiliates using the operational
data on multinational enterprises. They have not found a consensus answer, however, and
overall they suggest that the effect is very small even if a sign can be identified. However,
these datasets by definition exclude both non-outsourcing firms and the exiting firms which
destroy a massive amount of jobs in chapter II of this dissertation. The finding of this
chapter suggests that in order to measure the true size of the employment effect of offshore
outsourcing, the employment responses of non-outsourcers and exiting firms should be taken
into account.
The separation of job destruction and creation shows that the negative net aggregate
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employment effect stems from separate job destruction and creation effects that are very
large. This indicates that there is a massive movement of workers from destroyed jobs to
newly created jobs. The numerical analysis also shows that when only job destruction is
separated from job creation, the job destruction by outsourcing firms accounts for the ma-
jority of the aggregate job destruction. The ambiguous net employment effect of outsourcing
firms is a combination of large job destruction and comparably large job creation. Even if
their massive job destruction is mostly offset by their own job creation, their destructive
employment effects should not be understated.
This result has very important policy relevance. Job destruction tends to be concen-
trated in low-skilled jobs, while the newly created jobs are likely to be high-skilled. In order
to reduce adjustment costs of workers displaced due to outsourcing, we need a dislocated-
workers program that can aid workers’ transition across occupations - such as the TAA
program, which is the subject of investigation in chapter IV. The quantification of job
destruction and identification of its sources are necessary for effective policy preparation.
In chapter III, firms are homogeneous, so they behave identically. These firms within
each country - either north or south - share the same productivity technology to produce
differentiated products. Northern firms initially compete against cheap southern goods. As
outsourcing becomes feasible, northern firms get a chance to improve their price competi-
tiveness in the world market by sending their assembly or their service segment, or both,
to the low-wage south. While southern firms have no incentive to outsource their assembly
segments to the north, it could be profitable to outsource their service segments to the north
if technology differential in that segment is sufficiently large.
If the technology differential in the service segment is not large enough to compensate
the disadvantage of northern firms due to their high wage, northern firms outsource their
assembly segments to the south and southern firms outsource neither segment. In this
case, there is significant increase in northern share of the market. As prices of northern
varieties fall, the decrease in relative price of northern varieties generate a large consumption
shift from the southern varieties to the northern varieties. For the benchmark parameters
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considered, the numerical analysis shows a 61 percentage point increase in the northern
share of the southern market, and a 43 percentage point increase in the northern market;
together 35 percent of the world market shifts from southern varieties to northern ones.
In the absence of outsourcing, northern firms suffer greatly from their high relative
prices. If the overall technology differential of the entire production process is not large
enough, northern firms can not compete against the low wage of southern firms. In practice,
the technology used in firms of developed and developing countries is not vastly different
in some labor-intensive sectors such as apparel, textiles, footwear, and low-end furniture
industries. In these industries, northern firms will eventually lose their market shares to
southern firms and we have observed such a trend. Many developing countries practice
national strategies to improve their technology levels. As a result, the technology gap
between the north and south will continue to shrink in many sectors, and northern firms
will be forced out of the market in the traditional setting of international trade. Offshore
outsourcing widens the range of wage differentials over which northern firms can compete
in the world market. The price reduction that outsourcing brings to the northern varieties
enables the northern firms to compete in the sector where they would not be able to compete
in the absence of offshore outsourcing. In the process, there is large gain in the northern
share of the market, which in turn generates large job creation. The numerical analysis
shows that such job creation can be larger than the job destruction from the assembly
segment that is sent to the south, yielding net employment gain for various sets of parameter
values investigated.
The analyses of chapters II and III are based on the assumption of perfect labor mobility
across occupations. The investigation of job destruction separately from creation in both
chapters suggests that there is massive turnover of jobs. As mentioned above, the jobs that
are destroyed are the tasks replaced by low-skilled southern workers; therefore, the workers
who are displaced in this process tend to be less educated and have limited skill sets. The
TAA program is specifically designed to help these workers who need to acquire a new set
of skills that are in demand, with its main focus on retraining services and income supports
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during training. In chapter IV, I investigate the efficacy of training services. Instead of
comparing trainees and non-trainees among the customers, I take a more direct approach
to measure the success in training service by looking at the match between Occupational
Skills Training Code (OSTC) and Occupational Code of Employment (OCE).
However, a match can serve as a good measure of training success only if a match is a
dominant career option; that is, trainees who can find a match will choose to get a job in
the occupation of a match. The first set of analysis tests the hypothesis that a match is
preferred over a non-match. For this analysis, I use two sets of variables: first, individual
characteristics of customers such as gender and ethnicity; and second, characteristics that
are related to learning ability such as educational attainment. Once occupational groups
are controlled for, trainees with higher ability do have a higher probability of matching,
which supports the hypothesis. However, trainees with higher education tend to choose
occupations whose skills are more generally applicable - e.g. management; therefore, their
matching rate is lower than that of less educated trainees if occupational groups are not
controlled for.
The second set of analysis investigates whether trainees with a match perform better
compared to trainees without a match and non-trainees in terms of the post-participation
earnings, wage replacement rates, and retention rates. Trainees show significantly higher
reemployment rates than non-trainees. The receipt of occupational skills training services
- regardless of a match - improves the reemployment rate by 5 percentage points. On-the-
Job Training (OJT) improves the reemployment rate by 10 percentage points. However,
the most important determinant of the reemployment rate is the age of the customers. Age
shows an upside down U-shape relationship with reemployment rates, with much larger
influence of old age than young age. Customers with age between 21 and 30 show reem-
ployment rates 4 percentage points higher than the customers of age between 41 and 50;
while customers with age between 51 and 60 have the reemployment rates that are 10
percentage points lower than those of the age group 41-50.
I find that matching substantially improves both wage replacement rate and post par-
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ticipation earnings. Matching raises the wage replacement rates by more than 4 percentage
points, and this is robust across various specifications. It is interesting to find that the
trainees without a match have lower post-participation earnings and wage replacement
rates than non-trainees. This implies that receiving training services alone does not guar-
antee better post-participation performance. Although matching shows positive effects on
post-participation earnings and wage replacement rates, these earnings variables are again
mainly governed by individual characteristics in terms of the size of influence. The effect
of gender is very large. Male workers have wage replacement rates 15 percentage points
higher than those of female workers. The effect remains at 14 percentage points positive
even when occupation groups are controlled for - which are highly gender specific. Age and
education are highly important. The retention rates are not affected by matching. However
these rates are largely stable across variations in any variables.
In conclusion, achieving a match is important in improving post-participation outcomes
of customers. The results show that although outcome measures for trainees are generally
better than non-trainees, occupational skills training alone - training that does not lead to a
match - does not improve the outcome measure. Since the training services account for the
majority of the total TAA expenditure, more efforts need to be made to better assess the
potential of the customers in successfully completing the training programs and to assist
the customers in choosing the occupations that will lead to desirable employment.
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